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Companies spend billions to promote their brand. But with increased trademark
recognition comes the possibility of losing exclusive rights to use that trademark through
a process called genericide. In determining whether a trademark has become generic,
courts have often turned to linguistic evidence such as dictionaries and media usage. These
courts suggest that linguistic tools reflect a trademark’s meaning. These tools are not the
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objective indicators that courts have assumed, however. This Paper discusses why using
dictionaries and media usage to prove genericide is a mistake and then turns to evaluating
another interpretive tool, corpus linguistics. Corpus linguistics, unlike other linguistic
tools, may prove beneficial for companies seeking to protect their trademarks. Ultimately,
however, linguistic tools—including dictionaries, media usage, and corpus linguistics—
cannot prove genericism because linguistic data may, at best, prove a term’s majority
usage. This is because the Lanham Act requires a showing of primary significance. This
Paper contends that courts should maintain majority usage and primary significance as
distinct concepts and, in this way, should reclaim the primary significance test.
I. INTRODUCTION
$WUDGHPDUN¶VYDOXHGRHVQRWFRPPRQO\DSSHDURQDFRUSRUDWHEDODQFHVKHHWEXWLW
RIWHQUHPDLQVDPRQJDFRPSDQ\¶VPRVWYDOXDEOHDVVHWV*HQHUDOO\WKHPRUHUHFRJQL]DEOH
a trademark becomes, the more valuable the brand. When consumers purchase an Apple
computer, their purchasing decision is driven in part by both emotional and logical factors
GUDZQIURPWKHLUH[SHFWDWLRQVDERXW$SSOHSURGXFWVJHQHUDOO\$WUDGHPDUN¶VYDOXHWKHQ
embodies the goodwill that companies have developed over time. Since many consumers
KDYHDIDYRUDEOHLPSUHVVLRQRI$SSOHIRULQVWDQFHWKHYDOXHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VWUDGHPDUN
stands at an estimated $170 billion. 2 Google and Microsoft would suffer losses of $101.8
billion and $87 billion, respectively, if they were to lose complete control over their brand
names.3 And since Forbes recently estimated that the ten most valuable trademarks are
worth a combined $706.3 billion, it is unsurprising that some companies spend billions of
dollars a year promoting and protecting their brand names.4
But with increased trademark recognition comes the increased chance that a
company loses control of its trademark through genericide, a process by which the mark
becomes the commonly used word for a general product or service. For instance, when
Google filed for its initial public offering, some wondered whether the term Google would
someday become synonymous with performing an online search²´UHVXOWLQJLQERWKDORVV
RI WUDGHPDUN SURWHFWLRQ DQG UHGXFHG EUDQG YDOXH´5 These fears were not without
foundation. Google has indeed been forced to fend off genericism claims in order to protect
its trademark rights.6 If Google loses its trademark protection because the public
2. Kurt Badenhausen, Apple Heads the World’s Most Valuable Brands of 2017 at $170 Billion, FORBES
(May 27, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2017/05/23/apple-heads-the-worlds-mostvaluable-brands-of-2017-at-170-billion.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Sean Stonefield, The 10 Most Valuable Trademarks, FORBES (June 15, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the-10-most-valuable-WUDGHPDUNV)RUEHVUHFHQWO\DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDW*RRJOH¶V
parent company, Alphabet, is vigorously defending the mark from genericide and noted its optimism that Google
wilOFRQWLQXHDVDGLVWLQFWLYHWUDGHPDUN³7RµJRRJOH¶LVV\QRQ\PRXVIRUVHDUFKEXWWKH$OSKDEHWVXEVLGLDU\LV
still fighting to protect its brand. A federal appeals court affirmed the Google trademark this month, ruling the
brand name was worth protecting in a case from 2012 involving cybersquatting of 763 domain names with the
ZRUGµJRRJOH¶LQWKHP7KHYDOXHRI*RRJOHLVVXUJLQJDQGLWZLOOQRWJRWKHZD\RIDVSLULQHOHYDWRUWKHUPRV
DQGRWKHUEUDQGVWKDWIDFHGµJHQHULFLGH¶´Badenhausen, supra note 2.
6. See Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (D. Ariz. 2014). Google need not worry about genericide
LQ WKH VKRUW WHUP DV WKH 1LQWK &LUFXLW UHFHQWO\ DIILUPHG D GLVWULFW FRXUW GHFLVLRQ WKDW UHFRJQL]HG *RRJOH¶V
distinctiveness as a mark. Judge Richard 7DOOPDQZURWHWKDW³>W@KHPHUHIDFWWKDWWKHSXEOLFVRPHWLPHVXVHVD
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expropriates the term Google WRPHDQ³FRQGXFWDQRQOLQHVHDUFK´ the trademark will join
a long list of other marks that have suffered the same fate, including Murphy Bed,
Thermos, Trampoline, Escalator, and Aspirin. Moreover, once a term has become generic,
a company cannot salvage its trademark from the public domain without overcoming the
colossal burden of proving that the generic usage has become nearly obsolete. 7 Given the
PDJQLWXGHRIDFRXUW¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHFODUHDWUDGHPDUNJHQHULFDGHFLVLRQ-XGJH5LFKDUG
3RVQHU GHVFULEHG DV ³D IDWHIXO VWHS´8 courts ought to carefully scrutinize the types of
evidence they find persuasive in proving genericism.
All too often, they have not. The legal test for genericide requires the challenging
SDUW\WRVKRZWKDWLQWKHPLQGVRIWKHFRQVXPLQJSXEOLFWKH³SULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFH´RIWKH
mark describes a class of products rather than a particular product made by the trademark
holder.9 )RUH[DPSOHWKHSXEOLFEHJDQWRUHJDUGWKHWHUP³7UDPSROLQH´²the name of the
SURGXFW¶VPDQXIDFWXUHU²as the name of the product itself and the common name of all
UHERXQGWXPEOHUVPDQXIDFWXUHGE\7UDPSROLQH¶VFRPSHWLWRUV
In applying this test, courts frequently turn to linguistic tools to determine whether
the generic sense of a mark has supplanted its trademarked meaning. For instance, the
Second Circuit, in declaring the term Murphy Bed JHQHULFIRU³ZDOOEHG´²and allowing a
competitor to use the term freely²relied almost entirely on dictionary entries and uses of
the term in newspapers and magazines.10 More recently, the Seventh Circuit credited
evidence showing generic uses of the term Beanie in newspapers, and a federal district
FRXUWIRXQGGLFWLRQDU\HQWULHVFRPSHOOLQJLQSURYLQJ*RRJOH¶VFRQWLQXHGGLVWLQFWLYHQHVV 11
Courts have not paused to consider the wisdom of relying on this kind of linguistic
GDWD KRZHYHU KROGLQJ PHUHO\ WKDW WKHVH WRROV ³DUH LQIOXHQWLDO EHFDXVH WKH\ UHIOHFW WKH
JHQHUDO SXEOLF¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI D PDUN¶V PHDQLQJ DQG LPSOLFDWLRQ´12 Instead, courts
depend on dictionaries and media usage to fin the true meaning of trademarks, reverencing
GLFWLRQDULHV HVSHFLDOO\ DV D VRUW RI ³OLQJXLVWLF %LEOH´13 And, because scholars have not
FULWLFDOO\HYDOXDWHGOLQJXLVWLF WRROVLQSURYLQJD PDUN¶V VWDWXVFRXUWVFRQWLQXH WRFUHGLW
linguistic evidence for establishing facts that linguistic tools are not capable of proving.
Dictionaries, for one, cannot prove that a well-known trademark has become
generic. A dictionary cannot and does not claim to reveal the primary significance of a
word in the minds of consumers. Dictionaries are useful only to determine the range of
possible meanings of a trademark. Thus, a dictionary may reasonably demonstrate that

WUDGHPDUNDVWKHQDPHIRUDXQLTXHSURGXFWGRHVQRWLPPHGLDWHO\UHQGHUWKHPDUNJHQHULF´(OOLRWWY*RRJOH
Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017).
7. In re Minnetonka, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q 772, *9 (T.T.A.B. 1981).
8. 7\ ,QFY6RIWEHOO\¶V ,QF)G WK&LU  -XGJH5LFKDUG3RVQHUQRWHGWKDW³>W@R
GHWHUPLQHWKDWDWUDGHPDUNLVJHQHULFDQGWKXVSLWFKLWLQWRWKHSXEOLFGRPDLQLVDIDWHIXOVWHS´ 
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); Colt Def. LLC v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 486 F.3d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 2007).
10. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989).
11. Ty Inc  )GDW GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKHWKHU ³%HDQLH´ DVLQ ³%HDQLH %DE\´ KDGEHFRPH JHQHULF 
Elliot, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 1170±71.
12. Murphy Door Bed, 874 F.2d at 101.
13. RANDOLPH QUIRK, STYLE AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 86 (1982); Stephen C.
Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain
Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1915±16 (2010) [hereinafter Definitional Fallacies@ ³>-@XGJHVFDQQRWHVFDSH
the reverence with which society regards its dictionaries²a reverence that often borders on the GHYRWLRQDO´ 
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some segment of the public uses the mark generically in some circumstances. But using
dictionaries to prove broader claims, such as the primary significance of a term, gravely
misunderstands how dictionaries are compiled and organized.
Using examples of the term in newspapers and magazines proves only slightly more
useful than dictionaries. Presented with this evidence, courts may view actual instances of
media usage²without having to rely on the value judgments of the lexicographers who
compile dictionaries. But this type of analysis is methodologically unsound. Without a
UDQGRPL]HGVDPSOHRIWKHVHLQVWDQFHVFRXUWVFDQQRWUHOLDEO\FRQILUPWKDWWKHSXEOLF¶VXVH
of the term is predominately generic. In the end, isolated media uses verify only that a
generic sense to a trademarked term is linguistically possible²that some writers or editors
use the term generically some of the time. That a generic sense is linguistically permissible,
KRZHYHU GRHV QRW SURYH WKDW WKH JHQHULF VHQVH KDV VXSSODQWHG WKH WHUP¶V WUDGHPDUNHG
meaning as the majority usage of a term.
A third tool, corpus linguistics, offers a promising alternative to these tools. This
method uses a computer database (a corpus) composed of naturally occurring words in
context. In this respect, a corpus, like the Corpus of Contemporary American English
(COCA) with PRUHWKDQPLOOLRQZRUGVLVDVRQHFRPPHQWDWRUQRWHG³OLNH/H[LVRQ
VWHURLGV´14 Corpus linguistic data avoids many of the problems inherent in other linguistic
tools, such as dictionaries and isolated media uses, because a corpus analysis provides an
empirical approach to determine majority usage. 15
This Paper evaluates the utility of corpus linguistics in genericide disputes and
concludes that, although the tool provides a useful alternative to dictionaries and media
examples and is capable of rebutting allegations of genericism.
Corpus linguistics, however, suffers from the same fatal flaw as the other linguistic
tools when employed to prove genericism. Linguistic data can show, at best, majority
usage, the way most consumers use the term most of the time. When courts rely on
linguistic data, therefore, they are using majority use a proxy for primary significance, the
actual legal standard. A proxy, however, is suitable only as far as it accurately shadows
the concept it purports to predict. Majority usage of a mark in speech and writing, often
expressed in casual, non-purchasing situations, does not accurately reflect how the public
perceives the mark²as either a source-identifying feature of a specific product or the
14. Ben
Zimmer,
The
Corpus
in
the
Courts,
ATLANTIC
(Mar.
4,
2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/03/the-corpus-in-the-court-like-lexis-on-steroids/72054/.
=LPPHULQWURGXFHVFRUSXVOLQJXLVWLFVE\QRWLQJWKDW³>F@RXUWVORng dependent on the vagaries of language, have
QHZTXDQWLWDWLYHWRROVWKH\FDQXVHWRSUHFLVHO\SLQGRZQKRZZRUGVDUHXVHG´Id.
15. The use of corpus data in legal disputes is a developing field, and courts have begun using corpus data to
determine the ordinary meaning of words in statutory texts. See State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Utah
2015) (Lee, J., concurring); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 849 (Mich. 2016); In re Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d 702,
Q 8WDK  /HH-FRQFXUULQJ )RULQVWDQFHMXGJHVKDYHVWDUWHGWRYLHZ³FRPSXWHU-aided searches
RIRQOLQHGDWDEDVHV´DVDQHIIHFWLYHWRRO³WRDVVHPEOHDJUHDWHUQXPEHURf examples than [judges] can summon
E\ PHPRU\ RQ >WKHLU@ RZQ´ Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1271 (Lee, J., concurring). Unsurprisingly, trademark
litigators are also becoming aware of this new linguistic tool. In a recent court battle between Apple and
Microsoft, the two companies hired competing linguists as expert witnesses who employed the COCA to analyze
ZKHWKHUWKHWHUP³$SS6WRUH´KDGEHFRPHJHQHULF See Expert Report of Robert A. Leonard in support of Apple,
Inc., Microsoft Corp. v. Apple, Inc., (Opp. No. 91195582) (T.T.A.B. 2007); Expert Report of Ronald R. Butters
in support of Microsoft, Microsoft Corp. v. Apple, Inc. (Opp. No. 91195582) (T.T.A.B. 2007). Apple also used
the COCA in a similar suit against Amazon. Reply in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Apple, Inc.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CV11-01327-PJH 2011 WL 2461075 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2011).
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common name of a general product. Because serious conceptual problems arise when
courts use majority usage as a proxy for primary significance, courts should give little
weight to linguistic tools when used to prove genericide, thereby reclaiming the primary
significance test.
Part II of this Paper introduces trademarks and genericide, briefly explaining the
policy rationales behind genericide. Part III lays out how litigants and courts have
traditionally proven genericide²including the use of dictionaries, magazines, and
newspapers²and proceeds to point out the flaws unique to these methods. Part III
introduces corpus linguistics and shows how its use may resolve many of the issues
inherent in other methods. Part IV demonstrates the use of corpus linguistics by analyzing
COCA searches for Xerox, Crock-Pot, Band-Aid, and Kleenex, trademarks that have
recently flirted with genericide. The Part continues by analyzing the data and showing that
corpus data may help to combat allegations of genericide (defensive use) but not to prove
genericide (offensive use). Shifting to linguistic evidence generally, Part V will examine
how linguistic data²including dictionaries, media usage, and corpus linguistics²cannot
prove genericide because the ultimate inquiry rests on how consumers perceive a particular
trademark.
II.
A.

TRADEMARKS AND GENERICIDE

Scope of Trademark Law

7UDGHPDUNODZJRYHUQVSDUWLHV¶XVHRIGHYLFHVWRGLVWLQJXLVKWKHLUJRRGVRUVHUYLFHV
from those of others. These devices generally consist of words, phrases, or symbols,
though the Lanham AFW¶V GHILQLWLRQ RI ³WUDGHPDUN´ IXQFWLRQV DV D EURDG XPEUHOOD WKDW
may, under certain circumstances, shelter indicators as broad as colors and scents. 16 For
LQVWDQFH0F'RQDOG¶V&RUSRUDWLRQUHFHLYHVWUDGHPDUNSURWHFWLRQIRULWVQDPHWKHJROGHQ
arches, Ronald McDonald, its slogan, and many other devices that serve to distinguish the
fast food chain from other companies. Despite the broad nature of trademark protection,
this Paper focuses entirely on trademarks comprising words or phrases because, first,
genericide befalls word marks almost exclusively, and second, the benefits and limits of
corpus linguistics apply only to word marks. 17
Trademark law, in its true form, seeks to protect both the producer and the consumer.
In enacting the Lanham Act, Congress set out in a committee report at least two purposes
EHKLQG WUDGHPDUN SURWHFWLRQ 7KH ILUVW SXUSRVH ZDV WR ³SURWHFW WKH SXEOLF VR LW PD\ EH

16. 86& ³7KHWHUPµWUDGHPDUN¶LQFOXGHVDQ\ZRUGQDPHV\PERORUGHYLFHRUDQ\FRPELQDWLRQ
WKHUHRI´ $SHUVRQRUFRPSDQ\GRHVQRWDXtomatically receive a trademark if it falls within this definition. To
register a trademark, the owner must also prove to the United State Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that the
³SHUVRQKDVDERQDILGHLQWHQWLRQWRXVHLQFRPPHUFH . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including
DXQLTXHSURGXFWIURPWKRVHPDQXIDFWXUHGRUVROGE\RWKHUVDQGWRLQGLFDWHWKHVRXUFHRIWKHJRRGV´ Id.; see
also In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the company could
UHJLVWHUWKHFRORUSLQNIRULWVUHVLGHQWLDOLQVXODWLRQEHFDXVHWKHSXEOLFDVVRFLDWHGWKHFRORUZLWKWKHPDQXIDFWXUHU¶V
product); In re Clark8634G 77$%  RYHUWXUQLQJDQH[DPLQHU¶VUHIXVDOWRUHJLVWHUWKH
floral scent of sewing thread because fragrance could serve a source-identifying function).
17. It should be noted that it is conceptually possible for other marks, such as symbols or colors, to undergo
genericide. However, the genericide process would almost certainly come because a mark owner ceased to police
its mark rather than because the public appropriated the mark by using it generically.
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confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably
knows, it will get the producW ZKLFK LW DVNV IRU DQG ZDQWV WR JHW´18 Second, Congress
ZLVKHGWRHQVXUHWKDW³ZKHUHWKHRZQHURIDWUDGH-mark has spent energy, time, and money
in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its
misappropriation by piratHVDQGFKHDWV´19 Trademarks, therefore, protect both consumers
DQG SURGXFHUV E\ SUHVHUYLQJ FRPSDQLHV¶ JRRGZLOO XVXDOO\ EXLOW RYHU WLPH DQG ZLWK
significant investment.
%H\RQG &RQJUHVV¶V VWDWHG SXUSRVHV DGGLWLRQDO SROLF\ UDWLRQDOHV XQGHUJLUG
trademark law²often based in economic efficiency. One such benefit lies in reduced
FRQVXPHUVHDUFKFRVWV³(DVLO\LGHQWLILHGWUDGHPDUNVUHGXFHWKHFRVWVFRQVXPHUVLQFXULQ
searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the more competitive the
market´20 When consumers recognize trademarks, it signals to them a familiar product
WKH\PD\UHO\RQWKXVUHGXFLQJWKHFRQVXPHU¶VVHDUFKFRVWVLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKLFKSURGXFW
to purchase. Consumers also benefit because trademarks encourage producers to maintain
a consistently high-quality product line because trademarks evoke in the consumer
UHIOHFWLRQVRIWKHSURGXFHU¶VUHSXWDWLRQIRUTXDOLW\ 21 ³,IWKHVHOOHUSURYLGHVDQLQFRQVLVWHQW
level of quality, or reduces quality below what consumers expect from earlier experience,
WKDWUHGXFHVWKHYDOXHRIWKHWUDGHPDUN´22
Not all marks, however, receive protection. Trademark protection only follows
distinctive marks, meaning marks that are capable of identifying to consumers a specific
source rather than a category of proGXFWV 7KXV D FDPHUD ER[ ODEHOHG ³&DQRQ´ ZRXOG
LQGLFDWH WR FRQVXPHUV WKH VSHFLILF SURGXFHU EXW D VLPLODU ER[ ODEHOHG ³GLJLWDO FDPHUD´
ZRXOGQRW$FRPSDQ\UHFHLYHVQRSURWHFWLRQIRULWVXVHRI³GLJLWDOFDPHUD´EHFDXVHWKH
term does not serve a source-identifying function.
Marks generally fall into one of five categories²generic, descriptive, suggestive,
arbitrary, and fanciful²along a scale, traditionally termed the Abercrombie spectrum.23 A
generic mark is one often used as the name for a type of good. A producer may not claim
WUDGHPDUNSURWHFWLRQIRUWKHZRUGV³DSSOH´RU³IUXLW´LIVHOOLQJDSSOHV7KXVDJHQHULFWHUP
HLWKHULGHQWLILHVWKHQDPHRIDJRRG DSSOH RU³WKHgenus RIZKLFKDSDUWLFXODUPHUFKDQW¶V
18. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
19. Id.
20. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting DOVR WKDW ³>E@y
identifying the source of the goods, [trademarks] convey valuable information to consumers at lower costs . . . A
trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to make higher quality products and to adhere to a consistent
level of quality´ 
21. See id. at 1430 ³7KHYDOXHRIDWUDGHPDUNLVLQDVHQVHDµKRVWDJH¶RIFRQVXPHUVLIWKHVHOOHUGLVDSSRLQWV
the consumers, they respond by devaluing the trademark. The existence of this hostage gives the seller another
incentive to afford consumeUVWKHTXDOLW\RIJRRGVWKH\SUHIHUDQGH[SHFW´ IRRWQRWHRPLWWHG 
22. Id.
23. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (1976). Judge Friendly is credited
with cogently explaining the different types of possible terms. He wrote WKDW³$UUD\HGLQDQDVFHQGLQJRUGHU
which roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the degree of protection accorded, these classes
DUH  JHQHULF  GHVFULSWLYH  VXJJHVWLYHDQG  DUELWUDU\RUIDQFLIXO´Id. But Judge Friendly also noted
WKDW³>W@KHOLQHVRIGHPDUFDWLRQKRZHYHUDUHQRWDOZD\VEULJKW . . the difficulties are compounded because a
term that is in one category for a particular product may be in quite a different one for another, because a term
may shift from one category to another in light of differences in usage through time, because a term may have
one meaning to one group of users and a different one to others, and because the same term may be put to different
XVHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRDVLQJOHSURGXFW´Id. (footnotes omitted).
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product is a species´ IUXLW 24 Producers cannot receive trademark protection for generic
terms because allowing one producer exclusive rights over a generic term would
essentially eliminate from the market a term competitors need to sell their own goods,
effectively creating a monopoly.
Descriptive marks prove more distinctive than generic ones, though they merely
GHVFULEHWKHSURGXFWRUVRPHIHDWXUHRILW³$WHUPLVGHVFULSWLYHLILWIRUWKZLWKFRQYH\VDQ
LPPHGLDWHLGHDRIWKHLQJUHGLHQWVTXDOLWLHVRUFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHJRRGV´ 25 One court
noted that a descriptive mark²such as After-Tan, for post-tanning lotion; 5-Minute Glue,
for quick acting glue; and Yellow Pages, for a telephone directory²VLPSO\GHVFULEHV³a
IXQFWLRQXVHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVL]HRULQWHQGHGSXUSRVHRIWKHSURGXFW´26 Since descriptive
marks are not inherently distinctive, failing to immediately serve a source-identifying
function, a descriptive mark may not receive immediate trademark protection. 27 A party
seeking trademark protection must show secondary meaning²WKDWWKHPDUNKDV³by long
use with a particular product, come to be known by the public as specifically designating
WKDWSURGXFW´28 Thus, by requiring producers with descriptive marks to prove a level of
public familiarity with the mark before seeking protection, the secondary meaning doctrine
VHUYHVWKHSROLFLHVRIWUDGHPDUNODZJHQHUDOO\E\SURWHFWLQJRQO\PDUNVZKRVH³SULPDU\
significance . . . in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the
SURGXFHU´29
The final three categories of marks are deemed inherently distinctive²protection
attaches immediately without a showing of secondary meaning. The first, a suggestive
mark, resembles a descriptive mark but suggests rather than describes the product or its
characteristics.30 $VXJJHVWLYHPDUN³LQGLUHFWO\FRQYH\VDQLPSUHVVLRQ´RIWKHSURGXFWDQG
requires a certain amount of imagination to deduce the exact nature of the goods. 31 OftFLWHGH[DPSOHVLQFOXGH³3HQJXLQ´IRUUHIULJHUDWRUVDQG³5RDFK0RWHO´IRULQVHFWWUDSV 32
Although suggestive terms are descriptive in WKHVHQVHWKDW³WKH\DUHPHDQWWRSURMHFWD
IDYRUDEOH RU LGHDOLVWLF LPDJH ZLWK ZKLFK D SURVSHFWLYH XVHU PLJKW LGHQWLI\´ WKH\ DUH
VXJJHVWLYH EHFDXVH ³D SHUVRQ ZLWKRXW DFWXDO NQRZOHGJH ZRXOG KDYH GLIILFXOW\ LQ
24. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 516 (2015).
25. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 (quoting Stix Products, Inc. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 295
F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
26. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e).
28. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Richkard, 492 F.2d 474, 477 (5th Cir. 1974). In Subsection (f),
the Lanham Act codifies the necessity of showing secondary meaQLQJIRUGHVFULSWLYHPDUNV³>1@RWKLQJLQWKLV
chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the
DSSOLFDQW¶VJRRGVLQFRPPHUFH´86& I 
29. .HOORJJ&RY1DW¶O%LVFXLW&R861, 118 (1938).
30. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 24, at 513±14. Suggestive marks were not originally recognized at common
law. Courts developed the doctrine because, at early common law, descriptive marks were not capable of
receiving trademark protection and FRXUWVWKRXJKW VRPHGHVFULSWLYH PDUNV ZDUUDQWHG SURWHFWLRQ ³,Q RUGHU WR
avoiding denying trademark protection to marks that were only somewhat descriptive, courts categorized these
PDUNVDVVXJJHVWLYHUDWKHUWKDQGHVFULSWLYH´Id. at 513; see Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10.
31. CHISUM ET AL., supra note 24, at 513±14; Induct-O-Matic Corp. v. Inductotherm Corp., 747 F.2d 358,
362 (6th Cir. 1984).
32. 8QLRQ1DW¶l Bank of TX Y8QLRQ1DW¶l Bank of TX, 909 F.2d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 1990) (explaining the
Abercrombie spectrum and giving examples); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson Chem. Co., 589 F.2d 103, 106
(2d Cir. 1976).
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ascertaining the nature of the products that thHPDUNVUHSUHVHQW´33
Arbitrary and fanciful marks, the final two categories and the strongest marks in
terms of distinctiveness, often get lumped together. However, the two categories are easily
distinguishable, and the distinction can have legal consequences.34 Arbitrary marks use
FRPPRQZRUGVZLWKGLFWLRQDU\GHILQLWLRQVWKDWLQQRZD\UHODWHWRWKHSURGXFW³$SSOH´
denotes a pomaceous fruit and the name of a multinational technology company. Apple
,QF¶VWUDGHPDUNUHPDLQVLQKHUHQWO\GLVWLQFWLYHEHFDXVHWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSURGXFWVKDYHQR
relation to genuine fruit products. Alternatively, fanciful marks consist of newly coined
words that have no ordinary meaning beyond that of a source identifier. Common
examples include Xerox, Polaroid, and Exxon. 35
When a company holds a valid trademark, which necessarily falls within one of the
protectable categories, it may police its trademark to ensure no one appropriates the
mark²IUHHULGLQJ RQ WKH WUDGHPDUN¶V VXFFHVV RU GLOXWLQJ WKH PDUN WKURXJK QHJDWLYH
association.36 If a court finds trademark infringement or dilution, the court will enjoin the
infringing party from further use of the mark and may hold them responsible to pay
damages. Since trademarks prove tremendously valuable to companies, potentially
including the goodwill created by billions of dollars of advertising, many companies
vigorously police their trademarks to protect their name, reputation, and market share.
Yet, an enforceable trademark will not always maintain its protected status because
some terms do not remain source indicative. As Judge Friendly explained in Abercrombie
& Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.³DWHUPPD\VKLIWIURPRQH>GLVWLQFWLYHQHVV@FDWHgory
WRDQRWKHULQOLJKWRIGLIIHUHQFHVLQXVDJHWKURXJKWLPH´37 A mark may lose its trademark
status by shifting from being protectable²being descriptive (with secondary meaning),
suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful²to being generic, a process called genericide.
Genericide primarily occurs under two circumstances: a product comes on the market that
has no generic name, such as cellophane, which began as a trademark for transparent sheets
made of regenerated cellulose, owned by Dupont Cellophane Company; or a trademark
becomes so well known (usually as the leader in the industry) that the public begins to
substitute the trademark name for the generic name, as happened with aspirin and
escalator.38 Thus, the public becomes unaware that the name refers to a specific product
33. Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-5RWK &RUS  )G   WK &LU   :KLOH WKH )RXUWK &LUFXLW¶V
explanation of suggestive marks implies a higher standard than most courts would require, it nonetheless
illustrates the concept of suggestive marks.
34. Apple is arbitrary for computers but generic for fruit. Thus, in the rare event that the owner of an arbitrary
mark expanded into a product market where the mark was generic, trademark protection would not extend to
products sold in that market.
35. Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 624 (6th Cir. 2003).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 1125. While any owner of a valid trademark may sue to enjoin the use of a confusingly
similar mark, only widely recognized marks have a cause of action for dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).
37. 537 F.2d 4, 9 (1976).
38. See Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). In holding Aspirin to be generic, Judge Learned Hand acknowledged the
difficulty of the question before him:
If the defendant is allowed to continue the use of the word of the first class [Aspirin], certainly without
any condition, there is a chance that it may get customers away from the plaintiff by deception. On
the other hand, if the plaintiff is allowed a monopoly of the word as against consumers, it will deprive
the defendant, and the trade in general, of the right effectually to dispose of the drug by the only
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or company and begins to use the trademark generically to refer to a broader class of goods
or services.
B.

Genericide

Generic terms belong in the public domain and receive no trademark protection
regardless of whether a mark began as a generic term, never receiving trademark
protection, or a once-distinctive mark slowly became a generic term. Once a term enters
the public domain, it can never serve as a protectable trademark. 39 However, the Patent
and Trademark Office refusing to register a generic mark differs from a court declaring a
popular brand name generic. The former prohibits a producer from enforcing its mark from
the outset, often before much expenditure, but the latter potentially negates billions of
dollars of advertising and the goodwill associated with a deliberately crafted reputation.
$V-XGJH3RVQHUUHDVRQHG³7RGHWHUPLQHWKDWDWUDGHPDUNLVJHQHULFDQGWKXVSLWFKLWLQWR
WKHSXEOLFGRPDLQLVDIDWHIXOVWHS,WSHQDOL]HVWKHWUDGHPDUN¶VRZQHUIRUKLVVXFFHVVLQ
making the tradHPDUN D KRXVHKROG QDPH´40 Additionally, discarding a once-strong
WUDGHPDUN ³PD\ FRQIXVH FRQVXPHUV ZKR FRQWLQXH WR DVVRFLDWH WKH WUDGHPDUN ZLWK WKH
RZQHU¶VEUDQGZKHQWKH\HQFRXQWHUZKDWWKH\WKRXJKWDEUDQGQDPHRQDQRWKHUVHOOHU¶V
EUDQG´41
However, when a trademark truly becomes generic, powerful policy considerations
IDYRULQJJHQHULFLGHRXWZHLJKDSURGXFHU¶VLQWHUHVWLQPDLQWDLQLQJLWVPDUN)RULQVWDQFH
D WUDGHPDUN PXVW \LHOG ZKHQ ³VHOOHUV RI FRPSHWLQJ EUDQGV FDQQRW FRPSHWH HIIHFWLYHO\
without using the QDPHWRGHVLJQDWHWKHSURGXFWVWKH\DUHVHOOLQJ´ 42 Sellers would find it
extremely difficult to market an escalator, a thermos, or a yo-yo without using those
terms.43 -XGJH3RVQHUKDVDFFXUDWHO\QRWHGWKDWRXUODQJXDJHLVQRW³VRLPSRYHULVKHGWKDW
no other words could be used to denote these products, but . . . if no other words have
emerged as synonyms it may be difficult for a seller forbidden to use [a trademark] to
FRPPXQLFDWHHIIHFWLYHO\ZLWKFRQVXPHUV´ 44 While some courts may imprudently cancel
a trademark prematurely, most scholars would agree that genericide has its place when
protecting a generic mark would amount to conferring a monopoly on one producer, most

description which will be understood.
Bayer Co., 272 F. at 513±14.
39. See 0LOOHU¶V$OH+RXVH,QFY%R\QWRQ&DUROLQD$OH+RXVH//&)G WK&LU 
³,QJHQHUDODJHQHULc term cannot be appropriated from the public domain and thus cannot receive trademark
SURWHFWLRQ´ +HQUL¶V)RRG3URGV&R,QFY7DVW\6QDFNV ,QF)G WK&LU  ³>$@
generic name . . . is irretrievably in the public domain, and the preservation of competition precludes its
SURWHFWLRQ´ 
40. 7\,QFY6RIWEHOO\¶V,QF)G WK&LU 
41. Id. (asserting that if even ten percent of consumers continued to associate the trademark with a specific
VRXUFHLWFRXOGOHDGWRVHULRXVFRQVXPHUFRQIXVLRQ 2QHVDOLHQWH[DPSOHRI-XGJH3RVQHU¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKHWHUP
³:HEVWHU¶V´ DV LQ :HEVWHU¶V 'LFWLRQDU\ The successors to Noah Webster produced the most recognized
GLFWLRQDU\ IRU GHFDGHV EXW LQ WKH ODWH V DQG HDUO\ V WKH WHUP :HEVWHU¶V HQWHUHG WKH SXEOLFGRPDLQ
because the public began to associate the term with dictionaries generally. However, consumers still, a century
ODWHUDUHFRQIXVHGDERXWWKHLVVXHDVVXPLQJWKDWRQH:HEVWHU¶VH[LVWVZKHQLQDFWXDOLW\DQ\GLFWLRQDU\PDNHU
PD\XVHWKHWHUPDQGWKHVXFFHVVRUWRWKHRULJLQDO:HEVWHU¶V'LFWLRQDU\LVQRZFDOOHG0HUULDP-:HEVWHU¶V
42. Id.
43. See id. at 532±33.
44. Id. at 532.
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often the most well-known seller.45 Since Congress never designed trademarks to be as
broad as property rights, avoiding monopolies and other policy considerations require
trademark owners to lose protection when their marks become generic. 46
III. TRADITIONAL LINGUISTIC TOOLS FOR PROVING GENERICIDE
Parties challenging a trademark as generic have often relied on linguistic materials
to establish genericness, including dictionary entries and print sources such as newspapers
and magazines. Courts have found these sources persuasive because they reflect public
usage or are themselves actual examples of usage. However, dictionaries and media usage
are not the objective indicators that courts have at times assumed.
A.

Dictionaries

Courts routinely look to dictionaries to determine whether a term has become
JHQHULFDQGUHDVRQWKDW³>Z@KLOHGLFWLRQDU\GHILQLWLRQVDUHQRWFRQFOXVLYHSURRIRIDPDUN¶V
JHQHULFQDWXUHWKH\DUHLQIOXHQWLDOEHFDXVHWKH\UHIOHFWWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶VSHUFHSWLRQRI
DPDUN¶VPHDQLQJDQGLPSOLFDWLRQ´47 In Murphy BedWKHFRXUWIRXQGWKDW0U0XUSK\¶V
trademark had become generic beFDXVHLQSDUW³WKHWHUP0XUSK\EHGLVLQFOXGHGLQPDQ\
dictionaries as a standard description of a wall-EHG´48 The court considered this significant
HYLGHQFHLQIDYRURIWKHWHUP¶VJHQHULFQHVV 49
Courts find dictionary evidence persuasive because they consider lexicographers
ZKR ZULWH GLFWLRQDU\ HQWULHV WKH DXWKRULWLHV RQ D ZRUG¶V PHDQLQJ 50 For instance, one
VFKRODUKDVH[SODLQHGWKDWWKHDOOXUHRIGLFWLRQDULHVVWHPVIURPWKHLUREMHFWLYLW\³:KHQ
dictionary makers find, in the objective data of everyday speech and published writing,
widespread use of well-known brand names in a fashion that has technical earmarks of

45. See Vincent N. Palladino, Genericism Rationalized: Another View, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 469, 471 (2000)
(arguing that trademark law needs more stringent standards to protect against unwarranted genericide but also
concedLQJWKDW³WKHJHQHULFQHVVGRFWULQHSURKLELWVH[FOXVLYHDSSURSULDWLRQE\RQHSDUW\RIDWHUPWKDWRWKHUVQHHG
to use in order to compete in a market for goods or services, irrespective of what purpose trademarks once served,
now serve or may someday come to VHUYH´  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW    ³7KHPRQRSRO\UHVXOWLQJIURPWKHDSSURSULDWLRQRI
a generic name would be described as a product monopoly but is more accurately a language monopoly. Unless
the owner of the generic name were the lowest-cost producer . . . he would license the use of the name to
FRPSHWLWRUV DQG UHFHLYH UHQWV LQ WKH IRUP RI OLFHQVLQJ IHHV´  J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:2 WKHG  ³7RJUDQWDQH[FOXVLYHULJKWWRRQHILUPRIXVHRIWKH
generic name of a product would be equivalent to creating a monopoly in that particular product, something that
WKHWUDGHPDUNODZVZHUHQHYHULQWHQGHGWRDFFRPSOLVK´ 
46. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 45, at 193± ³7KHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRQWKHVXSSO\RIWUDGHPDUNVIURP
denying protection to generic terms is slight and almost certainly outweighed by the benefits from pitching a
trademark into the public domain when it becomes generic. For this reduces the costs of communication by
making it cheaper for competitors of the (former) trademark owner to inform the consumer that they are selling
WKHVDPHSURGXFW´ 
47. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989).
48. Id.
49. Courts often cite to the influential treatise on trademarks, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS, for the
proposition that dictionary entries are persuasive evidence that a term is generic. See MCCARTHY, supra note 45,
at § 12:13.
50. Trademarks in Dictionaries, 59 TRADEMARK REP     >KHUHLQDIWHU ³Trademarks in
Dictionaries´@
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JHQHULFQHVVWKH\PD\LQFRUSRUDWHWKHLUILQGLQJVLQWKHLUGLFWLRQDU\HQWULHV´ 51 Thus, many
in the legal profession trust that, given dictionariHV¶ UHOLDQFH RQ REMHFWLYH VRXUFHV
GLFWLRQDULHV ³XVXDOO\ UHIOHFW WKH SXEOLF¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI D ZRUG¶V PHDQLQJ DQG LWV
FRQWHPSRUDU\XVDJH´52
Despite the idyllic nature of this account, the narrative does not accurately portray
the pitfalls inherent in using dictionary definitions to prove genericide.53 Although lawyers
DQGMXGJHVUHJDUGGLFWLRQDULHVLQKLJKHVWHHPHYHQZLWK³DUHYHUHQFHWKDWRIWHQERUGHUV
RQWKHGHYRWLRQDO´WKHVHWRROV³DUHRIWHQLQDGHTXDWHREMHFWVRIRXUGHYRWLRQ>VLQFH@WKHLU
compilation LV D GHFLGHGO\ KXPDQ HQGHDYRU´54 As Professor Lawrence Solan has
REVHUYHG³:HFRPPRQO\LJQRUHWKHIDFWWKDWVRPHRQHVDWWKHUHDQGZURWHWKHGLFWLRQDU\
and we speak as though there were only one dictionary, whose lexicographer got all the
GHILQLWLRQVµULJKW¶LQVRPHVHQVHWKDWGHILHVDQDO\VLV´55 Thus, dictionary users should note,
DVKDVWKH7KLUG&LUFXLWWKDW³>G@LFWLRQDU\HQWULHVDOVRUHIOHFWOH[LFRJUDSKLFDOMXGJPHQW
DQGHGLWLQJZKLFKPD\GLVWRUWDZRUG¶VPHDQLQJRULPSRUWDQFH´ 56
Additionally, several considerations should cause a court to hesitate before resorting
to the dictionary to prove the primary significance of a term in the minds of the public.
First, the materials that lexicographers use to compile dictionaries come from outside the
editorial oIILFHVVXSSOLHGE\SHRSOH³ZKRKDYHDIHHOLQJIRUWKHODQJXDJHSHRSOHZKRDUH
DEOHWRUHDGUDSLGO\DQGSLFNRXWQHZZRUGVRUQHZVKDGHVRIPHDQLQJV´ 57 This creates a
SRWHQWLDOSUREOHPEHFDXVHUHDGHUV³WHQGWRQRWLFHXQXVXDORFFXUUHQFHVPRUHWKDQW\SLFDO
RFFXUUHQFHV´58 Professional linguists, potentially because of their fondness for language,

51. Ronald R. Butters, A Linguistic Look at Trademark Dilution, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 507, 511±12 (2007) (emphasis added).
52. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 810 (2d Cir. 1999).
53. This Paper does not address the use of dictionaries to show that the term is generic prior to the use of a
mark, only the use of dictionaries to show that by its own influence a well-known mark turned generic. While
many of the same arguments against the use of dictionaries could be shown, using dictionaries to show that a
PDUN KDV DOZD\V EHHQ JHQHULF VWDQGV RQ ILUPHU JURXQG WKDQ XVLQJ WKHP WR VKRZ WKDW D PDUN¶V ³SULPDU\
significance in the minds RIFRQVXPHUV´LVWKHJHQHULFVHQVHEHFDXVHWKHSULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFHWHVWGRHVQRWDSSO\
to inherently generic trademarks. See Christian Sci. Bd. Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Evans,
$G   ³7KH>@OHJLVODWLRQUHcognized that there are two types of generic words or
terms: those that are inherently generic, and those that originated as trademarks but through usage suffered the
loss of their distinctive sense, characteristic, or meaning. . . . The [1984] Lanham Act amendments dealt only
ZLWKWKHODWWHU´ 
54. Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13, at 1915; Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the
Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH    ³>2@XUVRFLHW\¶VUHYHUHQFHIRUGLFWLRQDULHVLVQRWGULYHQE\WKHODWHVW
dLVFRYHULHVLQSV\FKROLQJXLVWLFUHVHDUFK5DWKHULWLVGHHSO\HPEHGGHGLQRXUFXOWXUH´ >KHUHLQDIWHU:KHQ-XGJHV
Use The Dictionary]. For a more general critique of the use of dictionaries in legal analysis, see also Craig
Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First: Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts,
6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL¶Y 401 (2003); Jason Weinstein, Against Dictionaries: Using Analogical
Reasoning to Achieve a More Restrained Textualism, 38 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 649, 663 (2005).
55. Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, supra note 54, at 50.
56. %HUQHU,QW¶O&RUSY0DUV6DOHV&R)G G&LU  ³$&RXUWDFFHSWLQJDGLFWLRQDU\
entry at face value is in effect adopting the lexicographical judgment as its own, even though such a judgment
PLJKWEHEDVHGRQSULQWHGPDWWHUZKLFKLIRIIHUHGLQHYLGHQFHZRXOGQRWEHFRQWUROOLQJ´) (citation omitted).
57. Trademarks in Dictionaries, supra note 50, at 738 (remarks by a lexicographer regarding how his team
creates a dictionary).
58. DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD & RANDI REPPEN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE
STRUCTURE AND USE 3 (1998).
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also tend to observe unique usages of a word more frequently than common ones. 59 This
could cause an overrepresentation of rare senses in the materials lexicographers have at
their disposal, which could cause dictionaries to include a word sense that, in fact, has little
significance to the general public.
Second, the dubious inclusion of unique word senses in one dictionary could
proliferate and spread through multiple dictionaries. Dictionary editors work mainly from
WKHLURZQVRXUFHVEXWDVRQHH[SHULHQFHGOH[LFRJUDSKHUH[SODLQHG ³QDWXUDOO\ ZH PXVW
keep an eye on the competition. . . . We tend to look at competing dictionaries to make
sure that we cover roughly whaWWKH\FRYHU´60 While the lexicographer accurately noted
WKDW³LWLVDSRRUGLFWLRQDU\HGLWRUZKRKDVWRJHWKLVPDWHULDOIURPRWKHUGLFWLRQDULHVD
SUDFWLFHZKLFKLVDFWLRQDEOHDQGXQHWKLFDO´LIDFRPSHWLQJGLFWLRQDU\KDVPDWHULDODQRWKHU
dictionary does QRW³WKLVLVDVLJQDOWKDWZHKDGEHWWHUKXQWDURXQGWKDWZHRPLWWHGWR
ORRNDWVRPHWKLQJ´61 7KXVWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VUHDVRQLQJWKDW³WKHWHUP0XUSK\EHGLV
LQFOXGHGLQPDQ\GLFWLRQDULHV´GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\PHDQWKDWDOOWKHVHGLFWLRQDULHVZHUH
entirely independent in deciding to include a generic sense. 62
Moreover, courts often employ dictionary entries to represent much broader
principles than a dictionary, by its nature, may reliably represent. In the context of a
genericism analysis, the Murphy Bed court contended, as near-conclusive proof, that since
GLFWLRQDULHVLQFOXGHGGHILQLWLRQVRI³0XUSK\%HG´DV³DZDOO-EHG´WKH/DQKDP$FWWHVW
was met²WKDW³WKHSULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHWHUP>0XUSK\%HG@LQWKHPLQGVRIWKH
FRQVXPLQJSXEOLF´ ZDVWKHSroduct not the producer.63 Dictionaries, however, make no
such claim.64 $QHQWU\IRU³0XUSK\%HG´PD\LQFOXGHWZRGLVWLQFWVHQVHVRIWKHSKUDVH
one depicting the trademark sense and another the generic sense, but most dictionaries
make no claim as to which definition predominates. Dictionaries, and the lexicographers
ZKRHGLWWKHHQWULHV³RIWHQIDLOWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQFRPPRQXVDJHVDQGXVDJHVWKDW
although fitting within the literal definition, fail to capture the ordinary sense of the
WHUP´65 In other words, dictionaries put the most common definition of a term side-byside with the most atypical sense of the word, and the reader must deduce which is which
through intuition.
,QGHHG WKH :HEVWHU¶V 7KLUG 1HZ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'LFWLRQDU\ RIWHQ FLWHG E\ WKH

59. J. Charles Alderson, Judging the Frequency of English Words, 28 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 383, 383 (2007)
(QRWLQJ DIWHU HPSLULFDOO\ WHVWLQJ WKH IUHTXHQF\ MXGJPHQWV RI SURIHVVLRQDO OLQJXLVWV WKDW ³MXGJPHQWV E\
SURIHVVLRQDOOLQJXLVWLFVGRQRWFRUUHODWHKLJKO\ZLWK>REMHFWLYHPHDVXUHVRIZRUGIUHTXHQF\@´ 
60. Trademarks in Dictionaries, supra note 50, at 738.
61. Id.
62. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989).
63. Id. While the Murphy Bed FRXUW JDYH OLS VHUYLFH WR WKH PDQWUD WKDW ³GLFWLRQDU\ GHILQLWLRQV DUH QRW
FRQFOXVLYHSURRIRIDPDUN¶VJHQHULFQDWXUH´WKHRSLQLRQ¶VUHDVRQLQJRUODFNWKHUHRIVWURQJO\VXJJHVWVWKDWWKH
court gave the dictionary entries near-conclusive effect. The primary significance test first appeared in Kellogg
Co., 305 U.S. at 118. The Lanham Act of 1946 (as amended in 1984) codified the Kellogg formulation of the test
LQ  86&     ³7KH SULPDU\ VLJQLILFDQFH RI WKH UHJLVWHUHG PDUN WR WKH UHOHYDQW SXEOLF UDWKHU WKDQ
purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become the generic name
of goods RUVHUYLFHVRQRULQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKZKLFKLWKDVEHHQXVHG´ 
64. 2QH OH[LFRJUDSKHU ZKR VSHQW KLV FDUHHU HGLWLQJ GLFWLRQDULHV QRWHG ³,W LV WUXH WKDW GLFWLRQDULHV DUH
considered authorities. I think we shrink from this designation. We do not feel that we should always be
FRQVLGHUHGDXWKRULWLHV´Trademarks in Dictionaries, supra note 50, at 743.
65. The Supreme Court 1997 Term Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361 (1998).
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Supreme Court and relied upon in Murphy Bed, expressly disavows any reliance on its
GLFWLRQDU\ WR GHWHUPLQH D ZRUG¶V SUHGRPLQDWH PHDQLQJ 7KH GLFWLRQDU\¶V LQWURGXFWRU\
PDWHULDO VWDWHV WKDW LW GRHV QRW ³HYDOXDWH VHQVHV´ DQG WKDW WKH QXPEHULQJ RI GHILQLWLRQV
H[LVWVRQO\DVD³OH[LFDOFRQYHQLHQFH´WKDWGRHVQRW³HVWDEOLVKDQHQGXULQJKLHUDUFK\RI
LPSRUWDQFH´DPRQJGHILQLWLRQV66 :HEVWHU¶VOLNHRWKHUZHOO-known dictionaries such as
the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), orders its senses historically. Even with those
dictionaries that claim to order word senses by statistical frequency²the most frequently
used senses ranking at or near the top²the rankings are not particularly accurate. 67 This
makes it nearly impossible to tell from a dictionary definition which senVHKDV³SULPDU\
VLJQLILFDQFHLQWKHPLQGVRIWKHFRQVXPLQJSXEOLF´²precisely the function courts suggest
dictionaries can perform.
Dictionaries prove a useful tool only for a much simpler purpose. This does not
suggest that they are useless to the genericism analysis; for individual entries may show
whether the public employs a trademarked term generically. As Professors Hart and Sacks
FRPPHQW³8QDEULGJHGGLFWLRQDULHVDUHKLVWRULFDOUHFRUGV . . of the meanings with which
words have in fact been used by writers of good repute. They are often useful in answering
hard questions of whether, in an appropriate context, a particular meaning is linguistically
permissible´68 A court should welcome dictionary evidence to determine if a generic
sense of a trademark term is linguistically permissible, but beyond this function the
dictionary cannot yield reliable results. 69
Yet, courts must do more than determine the linguistic permissibility of a generic
sense. As Justice Scalia noted in a case involving statutory inteUSUHWDWLRQ³7KH&RXUWGRHV
not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily
is XVHG´70 ,QDVLPLODUFDVH-XVWLFH6FDOLDDUJXHGWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VMRE³LVQRWWRVFDYHQJH
the world of English usage to discover whether WKHUHLVDQ\SRVVLEOHPHDQLQJ´71 $FRXUW¶V
MRE³LVWRGHWHUPLQH . . the ordinary meaning´72 Similarly, a court facing a trademark
dispute must determine more than how a word can be used. It must decide the primary
significance of a trademarked term. And consulting dictionaries, while probative of

66. WEBSTER¶S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a (1971).
67. See Mouritsen, supra note 13, at 1935± ³)RUH[DPSOHE\WKHPRVWFRPPRQO\HPSOR\HGVHQVHRIWKH
word deal is that sense which suggests a particular amount: i.e., a great deal or good deal. This is true both in
spoken English and in written texts. Thus, if the Random House [Dictionary] ranks its senses by statistical
frequency as it claims, we would expect to find this sense listed first. In fact, this sense is listed twenty-ILUVW´ 
68. Id. at 1922.
69. It seems reasonable that a generic dictionary definition is fairly reliable evidence that at least some subset
of the population uses the trademarked term in a generic sense. However, the opposite is not true. The absence
of a generic definition is not conclusive evidence that a trademarked term is never used generically. See Door
Sys., Inc. v. Pro-/LQH'RRU6\V,QF)G WK&LU  ³1RGLFWLRQDU\LVFRPSOHWHRUFRPSOHWHO\
up to date, or tracks the language of the marketplace perfectly. A number of generic terms are not found in
GLFWLRQDULHV´  $GGLWLRQDOO\ VLQFH GLFWLRQDU\ SXEOLVKHUV IUHTXHQWO\ UHFHLYH FRPSODLQW OHWWHUV IURP WUDGHPDUN
RZQHUVWKHODFNRIDJHQHULFVHQVHFRXOGRQO\VLJQLI\WKHSXEOLVKHU¶VXQZLOOLQJQHVVWRSURYRNHDPDUk owner.
See SIDNEY LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 406±09 (2d ed. 2001).
70. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (determining whether the
H[FKDQJHRIDILUHDUPIRUQDUFRWLFVFRQVWLWXWHG³XVH´RIDILUHDUP³GXULQJDQGLQUHODWLRQWR´DGUXJWUDIILFNLQJ
crime).
71. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 410 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deciding whether the 1982
amendment to the Voting Rights Act applied to judicial elections).
72. Id.
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SHUPLVVLEOH PHDQLQJV JHWV D FRXUW QR IXUWKHU WKDQ ³VFDYHQJ>LQJ@ WKH ZRUOG RI (QJOLVK
XVDJH´IRUDQ\SRVVLEOHPHDQLQJ73
B.

Media Usage

In addition to dictionary definitions, courts have often relied on other linguistic
materials, namely examples of usage from newspapers, magazines, and, occasionally,
trade journals (media usage). 74 Parties challenging the distinctiveness of a trademarked
term may introduce examples of print materials with the term used generically. The Second
Circuit has gone so far as to declare that media usage²specifically newspaper and
magazine usage²SURYHVD³VWURQJLQGLFDWLRQRIWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF¶VSHUFHSWLRQ´WKDWWKH
term has become generic. 75 3UHVHQWHG ZLWK ³QXPHURXV H[DPSOHV RI QHZVSDSHU and
PDJD]LQHXVHVRIWKH>JHQHULF@SKUDVH´WKHMurphy Bed court concluded that, paired with
dictionary evidence, the primary significance of the term was necessarily generic. 76
Although evidence of genericism may certainly come from newspapers and other
print sources, the way parties present this evidence to courts is methodologically
unsound.77 Courts must determine the primary significance of a term, but isolated
H[DPSOHV HYHQ ³QXPHURXV H[DPSOHV´ IURP QHZVSDSHUV DQG PDJD]LQHV FDQQRW SURYH
much more than dictionary definitions²that the trademarked term has a genuine generic
sense. It is a non-sequitur to conclude that since isolated generic usages exist, they must
comprise the majority of uses. Nothing short of empirical evidence can establish that one
usage appears more frequently than another, and in the absence of such empirical data,
courts will be left solely to their own intuition to declare the victor.
Leaving the primary significance determination to human intuition is an inequitable
result, both to the losing party and to trademark policy. This is due to the unreliable nature
of human intuition when determining the semantic sense other individuals use more
commonly.78 $V3URIHVVRUV0F(QHU\DQG:LOVRQKDYHH[SODLQHG³+XPDQEHLQJVKDYH
only the vaguest notion of the frequency of a construct or a word . . . [t]here are certain
W\SHVRIODQJXDJHGDWDZKLFKFDQRQO\EHJDWKHUHGDFFXUDWHO\IURPDFRUSXV´79 Thus, since
IUHTXHQF\ LQIRUPDWLRQ ³LV QRW VXVFHSWLEOH WR UHFRYHU\ YLD LQWURVSHFWLRQ´ FRXUWV ZKHQ
presented with isolated examples of generic uses in newspapers and magazines, have no
reasoned way of determining whether these examples represent a fringe usage or the
primary significance.80 These empirical findings may only be achieved through direct
evidence or empirical methods.
73. See id. QRWLQJ WKDW ZKHQ SDUWLHV ³ODERU PLJKWLO\´ WKH\ FDQ ILQG D GHILQLWLRQ RI D ZRUG WKDW LQFOXGHV
PHDQLQJVWKDWDUHQRWWKHRUGLQDU\PHDQLQJ%XWWKDWLVQRWWKHFRXUWV¶MRE 
74. See, e.g., Loctite Corp. v. Nat’l Starch and Chem. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (using uses
of a term in newspaper articles to establish the genericness of a particular word); Birtcher Electro Med. Sys., Inc.
Y%HDFRQ/DEV,QF)6XSS '&ROR  DQDO\]LQJHQWULHVIURP³DUWLFOHVIURPVFLHQWLILF
jourQDOVWKDWXVHGWKHWHUPVJHQHULFDOO\´ 
75. Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989).
78. Id.
77. See infra Part IV.
78. See Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13DW ³>+@XPDQLQWXLWLRQDERXWthe frequency of
OH[LFDOLWHPVLVRIWHQXQUHOLDEOH´ 
79. TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 15 (2d ed. 2003).
80. Id.
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IV. CORPUS LINGUISTICS
Unlike the qualitative methods of consulting dictionary definitions and analyzing
isolated print sources, which merely offer proof of linguistic permissibility, the primary
significance determination may, under certain circumstances, be enhanced by a
quantitative analysis through a linguistic methodology called corpus linguistics. 81 In
general terms, corpus linguistics, through the review of collections of written and spoken
language, facilitates the study of language function and use.82 The words in the corpus, an
electronic database, occur naturally, meaning that they come from everyday uses of words
in contexts such as literary fiction, newspapers, magazines, and academic journals. This
gives insight into how the public actually uses language. 83
This Paper uses the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) to illustrate
WKHXWLOLW\RIFRUSXVDQDO\VLVEHFDXVHLW³LVWKHODUJHVWIUHHO\-available corpus of English,
and the only large and balanced corpus of APHULFDQ(QJOLVK´84 The COCA documents
roughly four million words used each year from 1990 to 2015 in each of five categories²
spoken, fiction, magazine, newspaper, and academic²for a total of nearly 534 million
words.85 While the COCA may not appropriately represent the consuming public if
consumers consist of a specialized group²perhaps professional buyers²courts
traditionally assume that the consuming public includes the general public, reliably
represented in the COCA.86
The COCA contains diverse tools for varying linguistic analyses, though this Section
focuses on only a few features that assist in determining majority usage. 87 First, the corpus

81. Corpus linguistics is quantitative in nature in the sense that it allows the researcher to find a random
sampling of a particular usage, find the most frequent collocates, and test for frequency. However, as discussed
below, corpus linguistic data involves a qualitative component since much of the data must be qualitatively
analyzed.
82. DOUGLAS BIBER, Corpus-based and Corpus-driven Analysis of Language Variation and Use, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 159 (Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds., 2009).
83. See Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics As an Empirical
Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 159 (2011) [hereinafter Hard Cases].
84. See CORPUS OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ENGLISH (COCA), http://corpus.byu.edu/coca. The COCA
was created by Mark Davies, a professor of linguistics at Brigham Young University. BYU also maintains the
Corpus of Historical American English (COHA) and the News on the Web Corpus (NOW), a continually
updating database with nearly four billion words. Each of these corpora could potentially be useful in analyzing
trademark issues.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g %XUJHU .LQJ &RUS Y 3LOJULP¶V 3ULGH &RUS  ) 6XSS  6' )OD   See also,
MCCARTHY, supra note 45, at § 12: ³)RURUGLQDU\FRQVXPHUJRRGV . LWLVDWHUP¶VPHDQLQJWRFRQVXPHUV
not to profHVVLRQDOVLQWKHWUDGHWKDWLVWKHWHVWRIJHQHULFQHVVDQGGHVFULSWLYHQHVV´ 
87. Stephen Mouritsen provides a thorough overview of COCA in his article on corpus linguistics in statutory
interpretation. See Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13, at 1956±98. Corpus linguistic analysis, in
the context of a genericness determination, is similar to how some scholars and judge have begun to use corpus
data in statutory interpretation. Scholars and judges have posited that corpus linguistics may be helpful to
GHWHUPLQHWKHRUGLQDU\PHDQLQJRIVWDWXWRU\ZRUGVEHFDXVHZHFDQDVVXPHLQPRVWFDVHVWKDW³&RQJUHVVXVHV
FRPPRQZRUGVLQWKHLUSRSXODUPHDQLQJDVXVHGLQWKHFRPPRQVSHHFKRIPHQ´See Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 527 (1947); Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies,
supra note 13; Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2027 (2005)
>KHUHLQDIWHU³1HZ7H[W´@; Mouritsen, Hard Cases, supra note 83. See also FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397
(2011); State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Utah 2015) ³,ZRXOGLQWHUSUHWWKHWHUPVRIWKHVWDWXWHE\ORRNLQJ
for real-ZRUOGH[DPSOHVRILWVNH\ZRUGVLQDFWXDOZULWWHQODQJXDJHLQLWVQDWLYHFRQWH[W´ In re Baby E.Z., 266
P.3d 702, 724 n.21 (Utah 2011); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838 (Mich. 2016); ³:HDSSO\DWRROWKDW
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returns a random sampling of a particular word, avoiding claims of cherry-picking
favorable examples from newspapers or magazines.88 The COCA contains 1197 instances
of Xerox, and, by selecting this option, the corpus will display one hundred, two hundred,
five hundred, or one thousand randomized instances of the word. Second, words in the
corpus are tagged for grammatical content, which allows the user to search for and
compare, for example, instances of Google, Skype, or Fed-Ex used as a verb versus a noun.
While most genericide cases will analyze the uses of the trademarked term in all
grammatical contexts, this feature may potentially be useful under specialized
circumstances.89
7KLUGODEHOVLGHQWLI\LQJHDFKHQWU\¶V\HDUDQGFDWHJRU\PDNHLWSRVVLEOHWRFRPSDUH
DZRUG¶VXVHLQSULQWYHUVXVVSRNHQPHGLDRUWRFRPSDUHKRZDZRUG¶VXVHKDVFKDQJHG
over a certain span of time. Thus, if a party claims that a term has only been generic for
the last ten years, results from years previous could be excluded to test the claim. 90 This
type of analysis would require more than skimming the corpus results, but the corpus data
provides the springboard for a more comprehensive analysis.
Fourth, a corpus search is arranged in concordance lines (also known as Key Word
in Context (KWIC)), which allows the researcher to see each individual result in the
context of its original sentence. The corpus also permits for an expanded view that lets the
XVHUUHDGWKHVXUURXQGLQJZRUGVWRGHWHUPLQHPRUHDFFXUDWHO\WKHWHUP¶VXVDJH7KLV
allows one to code the distinct usages of a trademarked term, distinguishing between
generic senses and tradePDUNHGVHQVHVVXFKDV³>,WDOORFFXUUHG@LQDFURFNSRWRIIDFWIDX[
KLVWRU\DQGVFLHQFHILFWLRQ´ JHQHULF DQG³>7@KHUHZDVDOZD\VWKHHOHFWULFVORZFRRNHU
like the Crock-3RW´ WUDGHPDUNHG 
Fifth, the COCA includes a simple tool to search for collocates, words most typically
used with a particular term.91 &ROORFDWLRQVKRZV³WKHWHQGHQF\RIFHUWDLQZRUGVWREHXVHG
LQWKHVDPHVHPDQWLFHQYLURQPHQWDVRWKHUZRUGV´WKXVDVVLVWLQJLQILQGLQJDVVRFLDWLRQV
between words.92 7RGRWKLVWKHFRUSXV³FRXQWVWKHinstances of all words occurring within
a particular span, for example, four words to the left of the node word and four words to
WKHULJKW´DQGOLVWVHDFKFROORFDWHDFFRUGLQJWRIUHTXHQF\ 93 Unlike with concordance lines,
the COCA reviews every instance of the target word to create a collocation list. A
FROORFDWLRQ OLVW ³LV WKHUHIRUH µVRPHWKLQJ RI D VKRUW-cut to the information that could be
REWDLQHGIURPFRQFRUGDQFHOLQHV¶DQGPD\EHXVHGWRFRQILUPWKHGDWDDOUHDG\H[WUDFWHG
IURPWKHFRUSXV´94 In the trademark context, collocations may prove useful in comparing

FDQDLGLQWKHGLVFRYHU\RIµKRZSDUWLFXODUZRUGVRUSKUDVHVDUHDFWXDOO\XVHGLQZULWWHQRUVSRNHQ(QJOLVK¶´)
(citation omitted). In similar fashion, corpus linguistics may assist in determining how the consuming public uses
trademarked terms.
88. The links to each COCA search may be easily saved and shared, so parties may verify the accuracy of
the results and the interpretation of individual entries.
89. See, e.g., Elliott v. Google Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2017) (rejecting an argument that Google
is generic because it is often used as a verb).
90. Though the corpus contains this feature, if the scope is too limited (for example, limiting the relevant
period to five or ten years), the corpus may not contain enough examples to be helpful.
91. Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13, at 1962.
92. Id.
93. SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS 69 (2002).
94. Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13DW ³&ROORFDWLRQVWDWLVWLFVµFDQEHKHOSIXOWRWKH
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what words co-occur with the trademarked term versus the recognized generic term (e.g.
Crock-Pot versus slow cooker) to confirm or reject that the terms are near synonyms and
are often used in a similar manner.
Sixth, the COCA allows a user to see the overall frequency of a word in the corpus.
In other words, the corpus shows how frequently the word appears per one million words. 95
While this indicator holds no significant meaning for other corpus analyses, since it often
only matters how frequently a particular sense appears rather than how frequently the
general word appears, in a genericide inquiry, it proves potentially relevant. For instance,
the relative frequency of a trademarked term and its generic counterpart might evidence
WKHSXEOLF¶VDZDUHQHVVDQGXVDJHRIWKHJHQHULFZRUG:KLOHWKHWHVWIRUJHQHULFLGHGRHV
not rely on the availability of alternative words to describe a product, if the public uses
³PHGLFDOVZDE´RU³FRWWRQ-tipped applicatRU´PRUHIUHTXHQWO\WKDQLWXVHVWKHWHUP4-Tip,
it might be probative that the trademark retains its distinctiveness. 96 Such evidence could
QRWDORQHSURYHJHQHULFQHVVEXWOLNHFROORFDWLRQVLWFRXOGEHDVKRUWFXWWR³FRQILUPGDWD
already extracted from WKHFRUSXV´97
Through these tools, trademark owners and challengers alike may offer more robust
arguments about how the consuming public uses the disputed term because corpus analysis
³HVVHQWLDOO\WHOOVXVZKDWDODQJXDJHLVOLNHDQG . . is a more reliable guide to language
XVH WKDQQDWLYH VSHDNHULQWXLWLRQ´98 As Professor Lawrence Solan, one of the foremost
VFKRODUVDWWKHLQWHUVHFWLRQRIODZDQGOLQJXLVWLFVKDVQRWHG³$FFHVVWRFRPSXWHUVQRZ
makes it relatively simple to see how words are used in commerce and in common
SDUODQFH´99 +HFRQWLQXHVWKDWFRUSXVOLQJXLVWLFV³DOORZVMXGJHVWRHDVLO\EHFRPHWKHLURZQ
lexicographers. If they perform that task seriously, they stand to learn more about how
ZRUGVDUHRUGLQDULO\XVHGWKDQE\WRGD\¶VPHWKRGRIILJhting over which dictionary is the

corpus user in summarizing some of the information to be found in concordance lines, thereby allowing more
instances of a wRUGWREHFRQVLGHUHG¶ . . Put simply, the collocation data will show the words that are most
FRPPRQO\XVHGZLWKWKH>WDUJHWZRUG@´  FLWDWLRQRPLWWHG 
95. The relative frequency is determined by dividing the total number of words in the corpus, currently
533,788,932, by 1,000,000 (533.788932). Then, the total number of instances of the target word is divided by
533.788932. The output is how frequently the word appears per million words in the corpus.
96. See Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845, 863 (D.N.J. 1952) (since the public still used
other generic terms such as medical swab and cotton-WLSSHGDSSOLFDWRUWKHWHUPKDG³QRWFRPHWRPHDQWRWKH
consumer the product double tipped applicator as distinguished from a certain brand applLFDWRU´  Dupont
Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 75 (2d Cir. 1936); (the availability of a generic name did not
SUHYHQW ³FHOORSKDQH´ IURP EHLQJ JHQHULF); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)
(consumers knew the SURGXFWRQO\E\WKHQDPH³DVSLULQ´ZLWKRXWNQRZLQJWKHJHQHULFWHUP³DFHW\OVDOLF\OLF
DFLG´ 
97. See Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 13, at 1963.
98. HUNSTON, supra QRWHDW3URIHVVRU+XQVWRQQRWHV³$OWKRXJKDQDWLYHVSHDNHUKDVH[SHULHQFHRI
very much more language than is contained in even the largest corpus, much of that experience remains hidden
IURPLQWURVSHFWLRQ´ Id. While the claim that native speakers have more language experience than the largest
corpus may no longer be accurate (since some corpora now have billions of words), her observation that corpus
linguistics is more reliable than intuition remains true.
99. New Text, supra note 87, at 2060. Professor Solan calls the use of quantitative methods like corpus
OLQJXLVWLFV LQ VWDWXWRU\ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKH ³1HZ 7H[WXDOLVW¶V 1HZ 7H[W´ +H ZULWHV WKDW ³>W@KH QHZ WH[WXDOLVW
methodology relies heavily on a vision of language that itself contains an enriched vision of context. In particular,
it has replaced the plain meaning, dictionary approach to word meaning, with the ordinary meaning, probabilistic
approach. The result is that it is possible to rely on language judgments alone for a great deal of context-sensitive
DQDO\VLVRIVWDWXWHV´Id.
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PRVW DXWKRULWDWLYH´100 Thus, a corpus may aid in quantitatively determining how the
consuming public predominately uses a trademarked term and whether the public has
appropriated the trademark to refer generically to the product itself.
A.

Corpus Searches and Results

This Section provides four examples of trademarks that have flirted with genericism.
The COCA searches show that corpus linguistics may prove probative for some marks²
providing significant evidence of trademarked usage for Xerox and Crock-Pot²but being
almost neutral as to Band-Aid and Kleenex. This data, along with the theoretical discussion
SUHVHQWHG LQ 3DUW ,9 VKRZV FRUSXV OLQJXLVWLFV¶ SRWHQWLDO VWUHQJWKV DQG ZHDNQHVVHV LQ
defending against and proving genericide. More specifically, the data shows that
trademark owners could use corpus linguistics effectively to combat allegations of
genericide. However, corpus data alone cannot prove genericide because, in many cases,
trademarked and generic usages are indistinguishable. Additionally, a corpus analysis
yields only examples of usage²at most proving majority usage²but cannot effectively
prove the primary significance of a trademarked term in the minds of the consuming
public.
As noted in this Section, classifying uses of a term proves a difficult undertaking, so
I offer some details on how I coded the individual instances into the categories of
trademarked, generic, or ambiguous. While I make no claim to a generalized theory of
how corpus data should be classified, I suggest a few general points on coding the data.
First, capitalization does not necessarily indicate a specific classification. In standard
English grammar, capital letters denote specific entities rather than common nouns, 101 but
this test does not hold true for trademarked terms. Although one expert witness in a
trademark case attempted to classify trademarked uses in just such a way, explaining that
³>Z@ULWHUV XVH LQLWLDO FDSLWDO OHWWHUV ZLWK QDPHV WKH\ DVVRFLDWH ZLWK D SDUWLFXODU HQWLW\
demonstratiQJ WKDW WKH QDPH GLUHFWO\ UHIHUV WR RU LV SURSULHWDU\ WR WKDW HQWLW\´ 102 that
assertion in the trademark context is demonstrably false. In an age of automatic spell
checkers that correct non-capitalized uses of recognized trademarks103²added to the fact
that many publishers have style guides requiring authors to capitalize registered
trademarks²trademark uses often resist traditional linguistic reasoning.
Second, figurative senses are always generic uses of the term. A figurative sense is
one that is not intended to be understood literally, deriving its metaphorical sense from an
DQDORJRXV ZRUG RU SKUDVH )LJXUDWLYH XVHV RI WKH WHUP ³%DQG-$LG´ ZHUH HVSHFLDOO\
SUHYDOHQW UHIHUHQFLQJ IRU LQVWDQFH ³%DQG-$LG DSSURDFKHV´ WR SUREOHPV :KLOH WKH
speaker may plausibly be aware that Johnson & Johnson produces the Band-Aid adhesive
bandage, the references were necessarily to a metaphorical bandage and not to one
100. Id.
101. See RODNEY HUDDLESTON & GEOFFREY K. PULLUM, THE CAMBRIDGE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1757±59 (2002).
102. Leonard, supra note 15.
103. See Butters, supra note 51DWQ ³7KHXVHRIDPDUNDVD verb, on the other hand, would appear to
be far more robust linguistic evidence that the user does not think of the term as a brand name but rather as a
generic, even if (in this era of automatic spell-checks) the user capitalizes the term (e.g., Please Xerox this letter
for me!)´ 
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produced by Johnson & Johnson.104 Corpus data cannot prove subjective intent, focusing
entirely on measuring a WHUP¶VDFWXDOXVDJH,QRWKHUZRUGVDQDXWKRUZKRZULWHVDERXWD
³%DQG-$LGVROXWLRQ´ PD\DSSUHFLDWH WKH WHUP¶V WUDGHPDUNHGVHQVHEXW VLQFHILJXUDWLYH
XVHVDUHJHQHULFFRUSXVGDWD FDQQRWFDSWXUHWKH ZULWHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ7KHIDFWWKDWD
corpus contains only usage, as discussed in Section IV, creates both the benefits and the
limits of using corpus data in genericide cases.
Third, in the face of two plausible interpretations, one generic and the other
ambiguous, I conservatively coded the instance as generic. Similarly, only clearly
trademarked senses were categorized as trademarked. For instance, I coded as generic
³7KH ;HUR[ PDFKLQHV WKH SKRWRFRS\ PDFKLQHV DUH FKXUQLQJ XS KHUH´²because the
FODXVH ³WKH SKRWRFRS\ PDFKLQHV´ VHHPV WR EH D FODULI\LQJ DSSRVitive, signifying the
VSHDNHU¶V LQWHQWLRQ WR XVH WKH WHUP JHQHULFDOO\²despite the existence of alternative
interpretations that could render the sentence ambiguous. Conservatively coding the data
LQWKLVZD\VXSSRUWVWKH3DSHU¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWHYHQZKHUH many generic uses and few
trademarked ones appear, corpus data alone cannot prove genericide.
1.

Xerox®

Xerox Corporation, a Fortune 500 company best known for inventing the photocopy
machine and laser printer, sells business services and document technology products.105 In
2015, Xerox had $18 billion in revenue, 106 which helps explain how the name Xerox has,
in some quarters, become synonymous with photocopying. For example, the OED, after
DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKH SURSULHWDU\ VHQVH RI WKH ZRUG GHILQHV ;HUR[ DV ³7R Ueproduce by
[HURJUDSK\ WR SKRWRFRS\´107 As discussed above, this generic dictionary definition
demonstrates fairly conclusively that the generic sense of Xerox remains linguistically
possible; in other words, at least some members of the public use the term generically to
refer to a photocopy or to the act of photocopying. However, the corpus data shows that
Xerox leads as the strongest of the four marks discussed in this Section. Xerox has not
legally genericized; meaning, the primary significance of Xerox in the minds of the
consuming public remains the trademarked sense.
From the 1197 instances of Xerox in the COCA, I analyzed a random sample of one
KXQGUHGH[DPSOHV,QVHYHQLQVWDQFHVWKHUHDUHVWURQJLQGLFDWLRQVRI;HUR[¶VJHQHULFXVH
For example, one VDPSOHVHQWHQFHUHDGV³/HRQFKHFNVWKHDGGUHVVDJDLQVWWKH;HUR[RI
WKHSXUFKDVHFRQWUDFW´$OWKRXJKWKH ZULWHUFDSLWDOL]HG;HUR[WKHVSHDNHUUHIHUHQFHGD
photocopy²the output of a Xerox product²rather than a Xerox photocopy machine or
printer.

104. See .HOORJJ&RY1DW¶O%LVFXLW&R., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (reasoning that a term is trademarked
ZKHQFRQVXPHUVXVHWKHWHUPWRUHIHU³QRW>WR@WKHSURGXFWEXW>WR@WKHSURGXFHU 
105. ;HUR[¶V ILUVW PDMRU SURGXFW ZDV Lts model 914 photocopier, released in 1959. See EVA HEMMUNGS
WRITEN, NO TRESPASSING: AUTHORSHIP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BOUNDARIES OF
GLOBALIZATION 61 (2004). Since that time it is has become one of the leading companies for photocopiers and
related products.
106. Letter from Ursula M. Burns, CEO, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, to Shareholders,
https://www.xerox.com/annual-report-2015/shareholder-letter.html.
107. Xerox, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/231014?rskey=p6q9Qs&result
=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited June 9, 2018).
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Although seven percent of the sampled instances were generic, seventy-five percent,
were specific to Xerox Corporation. In other words, the reference invoked the specific
SURGXFHU;HUR[UDWKHUWKDQDSURGXFWJHQXV)RULQVWDQFH³7KHNLFNHUIRU;HUR[LVWKDW
in WRGD\¶VRIILFHVXFKVWUXFWXUHVPHGLDWHWKHIORZRILQIRUPDWLRQ²DQGWKDW¶VZKHUH;HUR[
PDNHVLWVOLYLQJ´GHPRQVWUDWHVDVRXUFH-specific reference. Xerox receives a leg-up in this
regard because, unlike many marks, the trademark doubles as the name of the corporation;
accordingly, many media mentions involve direct references to the corporation. While this
cannot save all trademarks, in this case references to Xerox Corporation and Xeroxmanufactured equipment show that seventy-five percent of the time the public encounters
a reference to Xerox, the usage refers to its trademarked sense.
The remaining eighteen percent of instances were ambiguous. Sentences such as,
³+HZDONHGLQDQGKDGDWZHQW\-PLQXWHFRQYHUVDWLRQRYHUWKH;HUR[PDFKLQH´FRXOGQRW
be coded. This example could mean either: 1) he had a conversation over the Xeroxmanufactured copy machine or 2) he had a conversation over the (generic) photocopier.
Without additional evidence about whether Xerox in fact made the machine, it is nearly
impossible to say for certain which of the two meanings is correct. This is similar to
GHFRQVWUXFWLQJ ZKDW D SHUVRQ PHDQV ZKHQ VD\LQJ ³*R JRRJOH LW´ 108 A recent court
RSLQLRQ DVWXWHO\ REVHUYHG WKDW WKH UHIHUHQFH FRXOG PHDQ ³D YHUE UHIHUULQJ WR WKH DFW RI
searching RQWKHLQWHUQHWXVLQJWKH*RRJOHVHDUFKHQJLQH´RU³DYHUEUHIHUULQJWRWKHDFWRI
searching on the internet using any VHDUFKHQJLQH´109 The court was highly skeptical that
H[DPSOHVVXFKDV³*RJRRJOHLW´DOWKRXJKKDYLQJVRPHLQGLFDWLRQVRIJHQHULFQHVVZHre
WUXO\JHQHULF,QWKHVHFDVHVOLQJXLVWLFGDWDDORQHFDQQRWGHFRQVWUXFWWKHZULWHU¶VLQWHQGHG
usage.
2.

Crock-Pot®

Crock-Pot is the original and most successful brand of slow cookers. Indeed, Crock3RW¶VVORJDQVSHDNVIRULWVHOI³,ILWGRHVQ¶WVD\&URFk-3RWLW¶VQRWWKHRULJLQDO´,Q
The Rival Company acquired a little-known company that manufactured the Bean Pot, and
in 1971, Rival reintroduced the product as the Crock-Pot.110 Currently, the trademark is
owned by Newell Brands, which also owns other successful brands such as Coleman,
Rubbermaid, Graco, and Yankee Candle. In 2014, the company sold 4.4 million CrockPots,111 and the brand accounts for as much as eighty percent of the slow cooker market.112
After reviewing the concordance lines or KWIC, I found that twenty instances of
Crock-3RW RUSHUFHQW ZHUHFOHDUO\LQLWVWUDGHPDUNHGVHQVH6HQWHQFHVVXFKDV³,Q
recent weeks, I have used my Crock-3RW LW¶VD5LYDODVDUHDERXWSHUFHQWRIWKHVORZ
FRRNHUVRZQHGLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV ´GHPRQVWUate an awareness of the particular brand.
108. See Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1165 (D. Ariz. 2014).
109. Id. at 1173± 7KH FRXUW IRXQG IRU *RRJOH UHPDUNLQJ WKDW ³WKH IDct that a majority of the public
XQGHUVWDQGVDWUDGHPDUNDVDQLQGLVFULPLQDWHYHUELVQRWGLVSRVLWLYHRQZKHWKHUWKHPDUNLVJHQHULF´ 
110. Funding Universe, The Rival Company History, http://www.fundinguniverse.com/companyhistories/the-rival-company-history/.
111. Sam
Sifton,
The
Slow
Cooker,
Redeemed,
N.Y.
(Feb.
13,
2015),
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/18/dining/the-slow-cooker-redeemed.html.
112. Mark Bittman, Slow and Low is the Way to Go, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2003),
https://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/29/dining/slow-and-low-is-the-way-to-go.html.
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Only four instances were sufficiently suggestive of genericness to warrant coding as a
JHQHULFVHQVH)RUH[DPSOH³'DGPDGHD&URFN-3RWDQGZHZDWFKHGWKH5DYHQVRQ79´
an instance of metonymy, references the cuisine rather than the slow cooker that prepared
it.
Finally, a full seventy six percent of instances were ambiguous; namely, the
examples do not indicate whether the person meant a Crock-Pot slow cooker or referenced
Crock-Pot merely as a generic label for VORZFRRNHU)RULQVWDQFH³,QWKHPRUQLQJEHIRUH
she went to work, Sophia would put supper in the Crock-3RW´LVDPELJXRXV7KHUHLVQR
indication that the person meant an original Crock-Pot, but given that a sizable majority
of slow cookers in the United States are the original, it is just as likely that the slow cooker
was in fact a Crock-Pot and the speaker specifically invoked the brand.
The collocation list, reproduced in Figure 1, suggests some intriguing patterns. First,
the most common collocates for Crock-3RWDUH³VORZ´DQG³FRRNHU´²its generic name.
This confirms the findings in the concordance lines and the dictionary definition 113 that
Crock-Pot and slow cooker are closely related synonyms. Second, slow cooker is used
more frequently in careful writing such as recipes (giving instructions about the size of
slow cooker to use and directing how to cook the food), while Crock-Pot is used more
IUHTXHQWO\LQFRQYHUVDWLRQDOFRQWH[WVLQERWKVSHHFKDQGZULWLQJ ³PDGH´³OLG´³FDUU\´
DQG³VXSSHU´ 114 Crock-Pot is also used more frequently to refer to specific types of slow
FRRNHUV ³VPDUW´³SURJUDPPDEOH´DQG³ZDUPHU´ 

Fig. 1
&URFN3RW
&ROORFDWHV
 6ORZ
 &RRNHU
 6PDUW
 0DGH
 /LG
 &KLFNHQ
 &DUU\
 3URJUDPPDEOH
 :DUPHU
 6XSSHU

6ORZ&RRNHU
&ROORFDWHV
 &RRN
 4XDUW
 &RYHU
 /DUJHU
 4XDUW
 &RPELQH
 /LJKWO\
 *UHDVHG
 $GG
 6WLU
 &URFN3RW

113. Crock-Pot, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/44653?redirectedFrom=cr
ock-pot#eid7825720 (last visited June 9, 2018). ³>$@SURSULHWDU\QDPHIRU DOLGGHGSRWZLWKDQLQWHJUDOHOHctrical
KHDWLQJHOHPHQWIRUFRRNLQJIRRGDWORZWHPSHUDWXUHVIRUORQJSHULRGVDVORZFRRNHU´Id.
114. $OWKRXJKWKHWHUPV¶FROORFDWHVVXJJHVWWKDW&URFN-Pot could be more prevalent in speech and slow cooker
more prevalent in writing, the data did not show any significant difference between speech and writing.
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Another telling data point is the relative frequency of the words Crock-Pot and its
generic counterpart, slow cooker. Crock-Pot occurs in the corpus at a frequency of .2
words per one million while slow cooker occurs at .78 words per one million, almost four
times more often. While this data alone does not preclude a finding of genericism 115 (since
the Lanham Act sanctions only the primary significance test), the finding reveals that
Crock-Pot, by its popularity, has not replaced its generic name. 116 Consumers seem either
to be aware of the Crock-Pot brand or to use slow cooker synonymously with but much
more frequently than the trademarked name.
3.

Band-Aid®

Band-Aid is a registered trademark of Johnson & Johnson, one of the largest
companies in the United States. While the company retains its trademark, the public has
long used Band-Aid to refer to an adhesive bandage generally or even figuratively to refer
to patching up a problem. The OED acknowledges the proprietary sense of the word but
DOVRGHILQHVLWDV³$WHPSRUDU\RUPDNHVKLIWVROXWLRQWRDSUREOHP´ 117 A review of the
COCA confirms that Band-Aid is indeed used generically more often than either Xerox or
Crock-Pot.
Only three instances of Band-Aid were clearly used in the trademarked sense. These
referred to specific types of Band-$LGVVXFKDV³6SRUW6WULSV´LWVHOIDUHJLVWHUHGWUDGHPDUN
RU ³SODVWLF VWULSV´ +RZHYHU ILIWHHQ percent of occurrences are clearly generic usages,
XVXDOO\ILJXUDWLYH([DPSOHVLQFOXGH³6KHOWHUVDUHDQHPHUJHQF\EDQG-DLGWKDWGRHVQ¶WGR
DQ\WKLQJ H[FHSW JLYH SHRSOH D QLJKW XQGHU D URRI´ DQG ³2XU IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW LV
suggesting some band-DLGDSSURDFKHVWREDLORXWWKHVHOHQGHUV´7KHUHPDLQLQJSHUFHQW
of occurrences were ambiguous, being unclear whether the references indicated a Band$LGEUDQGEDQGDJHRUDQRWKHUEUDQGRIDGKHVLYHEDQGDJH)RULQVWDQFH³$VPDOOWULFkle
of blood seeps from under his Band-$LG´FRXOGVLJQLI\HLWKHUVHQVHRIWKHZRUG
The collocates for Band-Aid confirm the results from the concordance lines. The top
collocate for Band-$LGLV³DSSURDFKHV´RFFXUULQJWZHQW\-six times, and each instance of
³%DQG-$LGDSSURDFK´IROORZVWKH2('¶VILJXUDWLYHGHILQLWLRQ,QGHHGILYHRI%DQG-$LG¶V
WRSWHQFROORFDWHVGHQRWHWKHILJXUDWLYHVHQVHRIWKHZRUGLQFOXGLQJ  ³DSSURDFK´  

115. Some scholars have argued that the test for genericism should be tied to the effects on competition. See,
e.g., John F. Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 868
(1984). While the effects-on-competition test is not currently the legal standard²and the arguments for and
against such a test are outside the scope of this Paper²corpus linguistics could prove effective in applying this
test becauVHFRUSXVGDWDFRXOGFRQILUPWKHSXEOLF¶VFRQWLQXHGXVHRIDVHSDUDWHJHQHULFWHUPVXFKDVVORZFRRNHU
for Crock-Pot.
116. The Lanham Act allows only for the primary significance test, but this does not make the existence of
alternative words irrelevant. Since the dominate justification for trademark rights is reduced search costs, the fact
that competitors have alternative words to describe their products is likely significant to many courts. See Mark
P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV.     ³>,@W
would be nearly impossible to overstate the extent to which the search costs theory now dominates as the
WKHRUHWLFDOMXVWLILFDWLRQRIWUDGHPDUNODZ´  HPSKDVLVDGGHG 6WDFH\/'RJDQ 0DUN$/HPOH\A SearchCosts Theory of Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223 (2007) (remarking that courts
and scholars generally endorse the search-costs theory and noting that search-cost justifications often limit
trademark rights in underappreciated ways).
117. Band-Aid, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15126?rskey=AtlRTB&res
ult=1&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited June 9, 2018).
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³SUREOHP´  ³VROXWLRQ´  ³VROXWLRQV´DQG  ³SUREOHPV´:KHQFRPELQLQJ the results
for the singular and plural (e.g. solution + solutions), the figurative results are even more
salient, as represented in Figure 2.
Fig. 2
%DQG$LG
&ROORFDWHV
 $SSURDFK HV
 :RXQG
 3UREOHP V
 6ROXWLRQ V
 %DQGDJH V
 %R[ HV
 6XUJHU\
 6WULSV
 &XW
 )RUHKHDG

%DQGDJH118
&ROORFDWHV
 :UDSSHG
 $URXQG
 +HDG
 $FH
 *DX]H
 +DQG
 :RXQG V
 $GKHVLYH
 &RYHUHG
 (ODVWLF

First, the collocates suggest that the term has a generic meaning because the word
Band-Aid often occurs with words implying a figurative sense. Second, the remaining
FROORFDWHV LQGLFDWH WKDW ³%DQG-$LG´ DQG ³EDQGDJH´ DUH UHODWHG V\QRQ\PV HYHQ WKRXJK
speakers use bandage in more contexts than Band-Aid. Both terms occur regularly in the
context of dressing wounds with various types of coverings.
The relative frequency of the two terms also provides insight into how consumers
may use Band-Aid and bandage. Band-Aid occurs 567 times in the COCA, which is a
frequency of 1.06 words per one million. Bandage occurs in 1160 instances, or 2.17 words
per one million, more than double Band-$LG¶V UDWH 7KLV GDWD DORQH FDQQRW HVWDEOLVK D
WUDGHPDUN¶VGLVWLQFWLYHQHVV HVSHFLDOO\VLQFHEDQGDJHLVXVHGLQDGGLWLRQDOFRQWH[WVDQGLV
therefore likely to occur more frequently), but the data suggests that Band-Aid has not
replaced the word bandage in public usage. Consumers seem to be aware that Band-Aid
is a brand or to use bandage synonymously with the trademarked name.
4.

Kleenex®

Kimberly-Clark Corporation introduced Kleenex brand facial tissue nearly a century
ago as a cold cream remover, but it quickly became a disposable substitute for the
handkerchief.119 It has remained the dominant brand of facial tissues and accounts for

118. 6LQFH³%DQG-$LG´LVQHDUO\DOZD\VXVHGDVDQRXQLQWKHFRQFRUGDQFHOLQHVWRHIIHFWLYHO\FRPSDUe the
WZRZRUGVRQO\FROORFDWHVRI³EDQGDJH´DVDQRXQDUHVKRZQKHUH
119. Andrew Adam Newman, Researching the Sneeze and How to Handle It, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/business/media/researching-the-sneeze-and-how-to-handle-it.html.
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almost fifty percent of the facial tissue market.120
A review of the COCA concordance lines shows that Kleenex is the weakest brand,
in the sense that the data rarely clearly shows the term being used as a protected trademark.
Merely six instances (six percent) were unambiguously trademarked uses. One sentence
UHDGIRUH[DPSOH³7KDQNVWR.OHHQH[IRUMRLQLQJRXU:LOGHVW'UHDPVWHDP´%XWRIWKH
four trademarks in this Section, Kleenex also had the fewest instances of plainly generic
uses²two SHUFHQW 2QH JHQHULF XVH UHDGV ³7KH 3anamanian people have sometimes
UHIHUUHG WR WKH .OHHQH[ SUHVLGHQF\ VRPHWKLQJ XVHG DQG TXLFNO\ GLVSRVHG RI´ 7KH
overwhelming majority of occurrences, 90 percent, were ambiguous. Examples such as
³6KH ZLSHG WKH LFH FUHDP RII KLV IDFH ZLWK D .OHHQH[´ FRXOG refer to a facial tissue
generally or to a Kleenex brand tissue. The remaining two instances of Kleenex were not
related to facial tissue (one referencing a start-up band called Kleenex), and are not
relevant to the genericism inquiry.
B.

Analysis of Corpus Data

Overall, the corpus data adds support to the theory that linguistic evidence alone
cannot prove genericide. However, corpus linguistics, unlike dictionaries and isolated
newspaper usage, may perform an important task²proving distinctiveness. In other
words, corpus linguistics may provide an effective tool for companies with distinctive
marks in combatting genericide claims. But, corpus data alone cannot prove genericide for
two reasons: First, in practical terms, for some marks that have generic senses, it is nearly
impossible to decipher the correct usage sense without additional extratextual evidence,
something lacking in corpus data. Second, as discussed below, even where significant
evidence of genericism exists, linguistic data only proves usage, not perception.121
The results from Band-Aid and Kleenex strongly suggest that corpus data cannot
always prove effective because classification issues plague the inquiry. Some examples
exhibit signs of genericness, but since the generic word often appears in the same
context²´,QHHGD.OHHQH[´YHUVXV³,QHHGDWLVVXH´²it is impossible to prove that the
speaker in the first example is not asking for and expecting a genuine Kleenex. Thus,
coding difficulties suggest that corpus data may not always demonstrate the genericness
of a term, even when the public primarily uses the term generically.
Yet, corpus linguistics is a promising tool for some marks that are used in contexts
where the trademarked sense is easily identified. From the data, Xerox, for one,
undoubtedly remains a trademark because a majority of the uses unambiguously referred
to a source rather than a general product.122 During litigation, the trademark challenger
would certainly produce dictionaries, like the OED, that demonstrate that Xerox has a
generic sense. The challengers would also likely produce cherry-picked examples from
newspapers and magazines from across the country that use Xerox generically. However,
corpus data would show that Xerox is used in its trademarked sense 75 percent of the time.

120. Id.
121. See infra Part V.
122. The fact that Xerox is the name of the corporation²and many references refer directly or indirectly to
the corporation rather than a specific product²does not change the analysis. The corpus data still shows that at
least 75% of the time consumers come across the word Xerox, it is in the trademark sense.
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Additionally, the corpus data would reveal only a limited number of instances where Xerox
is unmistakably used generically. Xerox Corporation could persuasively refute its
FKDOOHQJHU¶VOLQJXLVWLFHYLGHQFHZLWKDPRUHREMHFWLYHOLQJXLVWLFWRRO
Similar themes emerge from a review of Crock-Pot, where there is a consequential,
though not overwhelming, showing of trademarked uses but an almost non-existent
showing of generic uses. Corpus data may not prove that Crock-Pot remains distinctive to
the same degree as with Xerox, but the lack of clearly generic uses could effectively rebut
any dictionary evidence to the contrary.
Additionally, corpus linguistics may demonstrate the primary significance of a
trademarked term when used defensively. As discussed in Part V, primary significance
DQGPDMRULW\XVDJHDUHGLVWLQFWFRQFHSWVDQGZKHQXVHGWRDIILUPDWLYHO\SURYHDWHUP¶V
genericness, corpus data cannot prove primary significance because corpus data only
tracks usage. However, when a term is used in its trademarked sense, majority usage and
primary significance are not entirely distinctive concepts. Persons may use Xerox
generically²referring to a Xerox copy of a contract²but remain firmly aware of its
trademarked significance. But the same person cannot use a term in its trademarked sense
without being fully aware of its proprietary meaning. Thus, courts may use corpus data
that supports trademarked usage because, unlike generic usage, such data is probative of
the ultimate question of primary significance.
V.

MAJORITY USAGE VERSUS PRIMARY SIGNIFICANCE

Since many uses of trademarked terms are ambiguous, attempting to show the most
frequent use of a term²majority usage²may prove difficult as a practical matter.
Additionally, as a legal matter, corpus data alone can never prove genericide because
majority usage is not the legal test. Even if the corpus data unambiguously showed that
WKHSXEOLFXVHV³%DQG-$LG´SUHGRPLQDWHO\LQLWVJHQHULFVHQVH&RQJUHVVKDVQRWWLHGWKH
genericism analysis to usage. The Lanham Act expressly codifies the primary significance
test.123 6LQFHFRXUWVPD\QRWGHHPDPDUNJHQHULFXQOHVVWKHVRXUFHIDLOVWREH³WKHSULPDU\
VLJQLILFDQFH´ OLQJXLVWLF GDWD DORQH²including dictionary definitions, newspaper and
magazine examples, and corpus linguistic data²cannot conclusively show how the public
perceives a mark. This is so because linguistic data reflects usage. The legal test requires
a showing of significance or perception. The primary significance test requires more than
WKHSXEOLF¶VYDJXHDZareness that a trademarked term refers to a specific producer, but the
genericide doctrine also makes clear that consumers may view the trademark in more than
one way²and use the mark accordingly. Otherwise, the primary significance test would
shift to an absolute significance test.
The history of the test for genericide bears out this distinction. In 1938, prior to the
passage of the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court announced its test for genericide. In
123. 86&   ³,IWKHUHJLVWHUHGPDUNEHFRPHVWKHJHQHULFQDPHIRUOHVVWKDQDOORIWKHJRRGVRU
services for which it is registered, a petition to cancel the registration for only those goods or services may be
filed. A registered mark shall not be deemed to be the generic name of goods or services solely because such
mark is also used as a name of or to identify a unique product or service. The primary significance of the
registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether
the registered mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has been
useG´ 
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Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., the Court wrote that parties seeking to establish that
LWVWUDGHPDUNUHWDLQVGLVWLQFWLYHQHVV³PXVWVKRZWKDWWKHSULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHWHUP
in the minds of the consuming public LV QRW WKH SURGXFW EXW WKH SURGXFHU´124 When
Congress passed the Lanham Act in 1946, it did not expressly sanction a genericide test
and most courts continued to apply the primary significance test. 125 However, in the early
VVRPHFRXUWVVXEVWLWXWHGWKHSULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFHWHVWIRUD³FRQVXPHUPRWLYDWLRQ´
test.126 This test was sharply criticized,127 and Congress acted quickly. In 1984 Congress
amended the Lanham Act, codifying the primary significance test.128
$OWKRXJKWKH/DQKDP$FWGRHVQRWFRQWDLQWKHFODULI\LQJSKUDVH³LQWKHPLQGVRI
WKHFRQVXPLQJSXEOLF´WKHDPHQGPHQWFRGLILHGWKHKellogg approach. The Lanham
$FW QRZUHDGV³7KHSULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHUHJLVWHUHG PDUNWRWKHUHOHYDQWSXEOLF
rather than purchaser motivation shall be the test for determining whether the registered
mark has become the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it
KDV EHHQ XVHG´129 Since the 1984 amendment, courts have recognized Kellogg as the
FRQWUROOLQJSUHFHGHQWQRWLQJ³7KHµSULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFHWHVW¶LVWKHODZRIWKHODQGLWZDV
adopted by the Supreme Court in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. and subsequently
codified by Congress . . . ´130
7KHVKLIWIURPWKH³FRQVXPHUPRWLYDWLRQWHVW´WRWKH³SULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFHWHVW´KDV
not totally clarified the standard, however. Courts and commentators often refer to
³PDMRULW\XVDJH´DQG³SULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFH´V\QRQ\PRXVO\GHVSLWHWKHWZRWHUPVEHLQJ
inherently distinct concepts. Professor McCarthy, for instance, writes in his tremendously
LQIOXHQWLDO WUHDWLVH WKDW ³PDMRULW\ XVH FRQWUROV´ +H XVHV WKH WHUP ³PDMRULW\ XVH´
inadvisably, however. Despite his pronouncement that majority usage satisfies the Lanham
Act test, McCarthy also acknowledges that majority usage and primary significance are
GLVWLQFWFRQFHSWV+HZULWHVWKDW³FDVXDOQRQ-purchasing uses of terms are not evidence of
geneULFXVDJH´7KHSRLQWRIDQDO\VLVRFFXUVDWVDOHWKXVSUHFOXGLQJDVHYLGHQFHJHQHULF
uses in other contexts.131 $ SHUVRQ PD\ XQGHUVWDQG D WHUP DV D WUDGHPDUN EXW ³PD\

124. .HOORJJ&RY1DW¶O%LVFXLW&R86±19 (1938) (holding that National Biscuit Company
KDGQRULJKWVLQWKHQDPH6KUHGGHG:KHDWEHFDXVHWKHWHUPKDGEHFRPHJHQHULFIRU³SLOORZ-VKDSHGELVFXLWV´ 
(emphasis added).
125. MCCARTHY, supra note 45, at § 12: FDOOLQJVGHSDUWXUHVIURPWKHSULPDU\VLJQLILFDQFHWHVW³EL]DUUH
DQGDEHUUDWLRQDO´DQG³RXWVLGHWKHPDLQVWUHDPRIWUDGHPDUNODZ´ 
126. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 1326 (9th Cir. 1982). In AntiMonopoly, the Ninth Circuit sanctioned a survey that focused on the motivation of the consumer. It gave as an
H[DPSOHDWVXUYH\DERXW7LGHZKHUHFRQVXPHUVZHUHDVNHG³>Z@RXOG\RXEX\7LGHSULPDULO\EHFDXVH\RXOLNH
3URFWHUDQG*DPEOH¶VSURGXFWVRUSULPDULO\EHFDXVH\RXOLNH7LGHGHWHUJHQW"´Id. at 1326. The court noted that
³DERXWLQGLFDWHGWKHODWWHUUHDVRQ . . . We suspect that these results tend to show that the general public
UHJDUGVµ7LGH¶DVWKHQDPHRIDSDUWLFXODUGHWHUJHQWKDYLQJSDUWLFXODUTXDOLWLHVUDWKHUWKDQDVRQHSURGXFHU¶V
EUDQGQDPHIRUWKHVDPHGHWHUJHQWZKLFKLVDYDLODEOHIURPDYDULHW\RIVRXUFHV´Id. at 1326.
127. See Arthur J. Greenbaum, Jane C. Ginsburg & Steven M. Weinberg, A Proposal for Evaluating
Genericism after Anti-Monopoly, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 101 (1983); Lester L. Hewitt & Paul E. Krieger, AntiMonopoly: An Autopsy for Trademarks, 11 A.P.L.A. Q.J. 151 (1983).
128. MCCARTHY, supra note 47, at § 12: ³,WWRRNDQ$FWRI&RQJUHVVWRSXWDQHQGWRWKH1LQWK&LUFXLW¶V
purchaser motivation test for genericness. In 1984, the Lanham Act was amended to codify the primary
VLJQLILFDQFHWHVWDVWKHRQHDQGRQO\WHVWRIJHQHULFQHVV´ 
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
130. Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 144 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
131. MCCARTHY, supra note 45, at § 12:8.
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nevertheless employ it in a generic sense in casual conversation. It is the use and
understanding of the term in the context of purchasing decisions, however, that determines
WKH SULPDU\ VLJQLILFDQFH RI D GHVLJQDWLRQ´132 But linguistic data from dictionaries,
newspapers, magazines, and corpora usually provide just that²evidence of nonpurchasing, sometimes casual usage.
,QGHHG LQGLYLGXDOV PD\ IXOO\ UHFRJQL]H D WHUP¶V WUDGHPDUN VLJQLILFDQFH DQG
occasionally and under certain circumstances, use the term generically. This fact is
HYLGHQFHG LQ WKH 3DWHQW DQG 7UDGHPDUN 2IILFH¶V GHFLVLRQ WR FDQFHO HVFDODWRU¶V
trademark.133 In Haughton Elevator Company v. Seeberger, the PTO cancelled Otis
(OHYDWRU¶VWUDGHPDUNRQWKHWHUPHVFDODWRUEHFDXVHWKHWHUP³KD>G@EHFRPHDGHVFULSWLYH
name to both the general public and to engineers and architects . . . .´134 The
CoPPLVVLRQHU¶VPDLQHYLGHQFHZDVWKDW2WLV(OHYDWRUKDGXVHGWKHWHUPJHQHULFDOO\RQ
occasion in its internal documents and advertising. The Commissioner noted that Otis used
the term escalator in the same manner as it did elevator, a generic term, in advertLVLQJ³2WLV
HOHYDWRUV2WLVHVFDODWRUV´135 The PTO failed to recognize that usage and significance are
GLVWLQFWWHUPVDQGWRRN2WLV¶RZQXVDJHDVGLVSRVLWLYHHYLGHQFHWKDWWKHWHUPHOHYDWRUZDV
generic.
But this case highlights the problems with considering usage and perception as
parallel concepts. Otis Elevators might have used the term generically in its own internal
documents and advertising, but the company certainly recognized the term as identifying
a particular brand²its own. In other words, Otis employees who wrote the advertising
material undoubtedly would have identified the trademarked sense of the term escalator as
their primary association, despite their own usage. And facing a purchasing decision, Otis
employees surely would have distinguished between an Otis escalator and a competing
product.
Granted, escalator might have become a generic term by that point. 136 But the PTO
should not have relied on usage from actors that certainly distinguished its brand from
others as dispositive evidence on the matter. Doing so only shows that it did not understand

132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15 cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1995); MCCARTHY, supra
note 45, at § 15: ³%X\HUVRUXVHUVRIDSURGXFWPD\VRPHWLPHVXVHDWUDGHmark in a generic sense in casual
conversation even though when questioned, those persons are fully aware of the trademark significance of the
term. For example, persons may use Xerox or Kleenex in a generic sense . . . even though when going to purchase
a photocopying machine or a box of tissues, they know that Xerox and Kleenex identify the commercial source
of those products. Such casual, non-SXUFKDVLQJXVHVRIWHUPVDUHQRWHYLGHQFHRIJHQHULFXVDJH´ 
133. See Haughton Elevator, Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80, 1950 WL 4178, *1. The decision is lamentable
EHFDXVHWKHRSLQLRQLVDOPRVWGHYRLGRIDQ\HYLGHQFHRIJHQHULFLVPEH\RQGWKHRZQHU¶VRZQXVDJH7KLVHYLGHQFH
should clearly fail the primary significance test, but the Commissioner of Patents nevertheless cancelled Otis
(OHYDWRU&RPSDQ\¶VWUDGHPDUNUHJLVWUDWLRQ
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id., at *2 7KH &RPPLVVLRQHU QRWHG WKDW ³>L@W DOVR DSSHDUV WKDW WKH 2WLV (OHYDWRU &RPSDQ\ KDG WZR
UHVSRQVLEOH UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RQ WKH FRPPLWWHH ZKLFK SUHSDUHG WKH µ6WDQGDUG 6DIHW\ &RGH IRU (OHYDWRUV
'XPEZDLWHUVDQG(VFDODWRUV¶,QWKLVPRGHOFRGHµHVFDODWRU¶LVGHIined as a moving inclined continuous stairway
RUUXQZD\XVHGIRUUDLVLQJRUORZHULQJSDVVHQJHUV7KURXJKRXWWKHZRUGµHVFDODWRU¶LVXVHGGHVFULSWLYHO\ZLWKRXW
any indication that it designates origin of the type of device under consideration. It does not appear that any
protest was made by the Otis Elevator Company or their representatives on the committee to the generic and
GHVFULSWLYHXVHRIWKHZRUGµHVFDODWRU¶7KXVWKHFRXUVHRIFRQGXFWRIWKH5HVSRQGHQWZDVVXFKDVWRFDXVHWKH
PDUNRIµHVFDODWRU¶WR ORVHLWVVLJQLILFDQFHDVDQLQGLFDWLRQRIRULJLQ´ 
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the distinction between usage and significance. If usage in any circumstance could show
nothing about the primary significance of the term in the minds of the users, it was the
evidence the PTO credited in this case. While the facts of this case likely occur rarely, it
plainly shows how, logically, the concepts of majority usage and primary significance exist
as distinct concepts. As such, courts should treat them as distinct concepts.
Moreover, Congress recognized that the primary significance test would allow some
PDUNVWRVHUYHD³GXDOIXQFWLRQ´137 As one court noteG³,WFDQQRWEHXQGHUVWDWHGWKDWD
PDUN LV QRW UHQGHUHG JHQHULF PHUHO\ EHFDXVH WKH PDUN VHUYHV D V\QHFGRFKLDQ µGXDO
IXQFWLRQ¶RILGHQWLI\LQJDSDUWLFXODUVSHFLHVRI>JRRGRU@VHUYLFHZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPH
indicating the genus of [goods or] services to whLFKWKHVSHFLHVEHORQJV´138 In Elliott v.
Google, the court reasoned that the word Google, when used as a verb, could refer to using
the Google search engine to perform an internet search or to using any search engine. The
dual-function doctrine, however, suggests that it could mean both to the same person,
depending on the circumstances. The inquiry remains which sense²the trademarked or
the generic² LVWKHFRQVXPHU¶VSULPDU\DVVRFLDWLRQ
The linguistic principles of semantic shift and semantic broadening confirm the dualfunction argument. The notion of semantic shift provides the foundation for the genericide
doctrine. Words do not always retain their original meaning, adding new meanings and
shedding archaic ones, resulting in the meaning of a word shifting so that its meaning
differs from its original semantic sense. 139 Thus, a trademarked term may undergo a shift
from indicating a source to referring to a category of products, losing its original sense in
the process.
However, a word meaning may change without losing its original sense, a process
FDOOHGVHPDQWLFEURDGHQLQJ $V3URIHVVRU)URPNLQ KDV QRWHG³:KHQWKH PHDQLQJRID
ZRUGEHFRPHVEURDGHULWPHDQVHYHU\WKLQJLWXVHGWRPHDQDQGPRUH´ 140 Simply because
a trademarked term brings on a broader generic sense does not mean it loses its relevance
to speakers of the language. The generic sense may overtake the trademarked one in the
minds of the consumers, resulting in a loss of trademark rights, or the term could remain
with two senses indefinitely. In this circumstance, the court must determine which sense
predominates.
Since a trademark may serve a dual function, courts should not look to linguistic
data to prove the primary significance to consumers since a speaker may actively use a
trademarked term generically while continuing to associate the term primarily with the
trademark owner. In other words, courts should not confuse majority usage and primary
significance. Relying solely on evidence of majority usage would amount to an
abandonment of the primaU\VLJQLILFDQFHWHVW6LPLODUWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQHU¶VHUURULQOtis
137. See S. REP. NO. 98-627, 5 (1984), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5718, 5722.
138. Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1162 (D. Ariz. 2014) (relying on statements from the Senate
Report).
139. VICTORIA FROMKIN, ROBERT RODMAN & NINA HYAMS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 478 (8th ed.
2007).
140. Id. at 477; Ronald R. Butters & Jennifer Westerhaus, Linguistic Change in Words one owns: How
Trademarks Become “Generic,” in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE II: UNFOLDING
CONVERSATIONS $QQH&XU]DQ .LPEHUO\(PPRQVHGV  ³*HQHULFLGHFDQEHYLHZHGDVDVXEFDWHJRU\
of broadening, similar therefore to the process that has affected scores of English words²for example, dog,
which at one time referred to a specific kind of canis familiaris UDWKHUWKDQWRGRJVLQJHQHUDO´ 
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Elevator Co., when a court ties consumer perception to usage, it fails to take into account
DPDUN¶VSRWHQWLDOGXDOIXQFWLRQ7KXVFRXUWVRXJKWWREHFDUHIXOQRWWRFUHGLWXVDJHDV
establishing more than it is capable of proving.
This is enhanced by the fact that when courts fail to distinguish between majority
usage and primary significance, courts are often subverting the very policy goals upon
which trademark law is built. In other words, if a majority of the public uses a trademarked
term generically in non-SXUFKDVLQJ GHFLVLRQV EXW UHFRJQL]HV D WUDGHPDUN¶V VRXUFHidentifying function at the point of purchase, the policy rationales set forth by Congress
and the academic literature would disfavor a finding of genericism. That is, the policy
rationales for trademarks generally are in full force when the majority usage is generic but
the primary significance of the term is the specific trademarked brand.
This is illustrated by the policies Congress explained when it passed the Lanham
$FW7KHOHJLVODWLYHERG\QRWHGLWVGHVLUHWR³SURWHFWWKHSXEOLFVRLWPD\EHFRQILGHQWWKDW
in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will
get the product which it asks IRUDQGZDQWVWRJHW´141 Trademark law was supposed to help
distinguish products from one another. Consumers could rely, for instance, on getting
genuine Kleenex brand tissues when the box includes the term Kleenex.
But when competing companies are allowed to use the same term to identify their
products, consumers who are unaware that the mark no longer performs a sourceLGHQWLI\LQJIXQFWLRQ OLNHO\ ZLOOQRW ³JHWWKHSURGXFW ZKLFK>WKH\@DVN IRUDQG ZDQW>@WR
JHW´142 As Judge Posner noted, discarding trademarNDVJHQHULF³PD\FRQIXVHFRQVXPHUV
ZKRFRQWLQXHWRDVVRFLDWHWKHWUDGHPDUNZLWKWKHRZQHU¶VEUDQGZKHQWKH\HQFRXQWHUZKDW
WKH\WKRXJKWDEUDQGQDPHRQDQRWKHUVHOOHU¶VEUDQG´ 143
)XUWKHU&RQJUHVVZLVKHGWRHQVXUHWKDW³ZKHUHWKHRZQHURIDWUDGH-mark has spent
energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his
LQYHVWPHQW IURP LWV PLVDSSURSULDWLRQ E\ SLUDWHV DQG FKHDWV´ 144 Congress did not wish
FRPSHWLWRUVWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIDQRWKHUFRPSDQ\¶VDGYHUWLVLQJHIIRUWVE\VWUipping the
trademark owner of its rights when the mark reached the level of being a household name.
If consumers still identify the mark with the brand and distinguish between the
trademarked product and others at the point of the purchase, stripping trademark protection
simply because the generic sense is the majority usage ZRXOG RQO\ ³SHQDOL]H>@ WKH
WUDGHPDUN¶VRZQHUIRUKLVVXFFHVVLQPDNLQJWKHWUDGHPDUNDKRXVHKROGQDPH´ 145
This is valid especially with trademarks that gain enough popularity that the public
141. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
142. See id.
143. 7\ ,QF Y 6RIWEHOO\¶V ,QF  )G   WK &LU   DVVHUWLQJ WKDW LI HYHQ WHQ SHUFHQt of
consumers continued to associate the trademark with a specific source it could lead to serious consumer
FRQIXVLRQ $VQRWHGDERYHRQHH[DPSOHRI-XGJH3RVQHU¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKHWHUP³:HEVWHU¶V´DVLQ:HEVWHU¶V
Dictionary. The successors to Noah Webster produced the most recognized dictionary for decades, but in the late
VDQGHDUO\VWKHWHUP:HEVWHU¶VHQWHUHGWKHSXEOLFGRPDLQEHFDXVHWKHSXEOLFEHJDQWRDVVRFLDWHWKH
term with dictionaries generally. However, consumers still, a century later, are confused about the issue,
DVVXPLQJWKDWRQH:HEVWHU¶VH[LVWVZKHQLQDFWXDOLW\DQ\GLFWLRQDU\PDNHUPD\XVHWKHWHUPDQGWKHVXFFHVVRU
WRWKHRULJLQDO:HEVWHU¶V'LFWLRQDU\LVQRZFDOOHG0HUULDP-:HEVWHU¶V
144. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, supra note 18, at 3.
145. Ty Inc., 353 F.3d at 531. Judge Posner held that declaring a trademark generic should only occur when a
³WUDGHPDUNKDVJRQHVRIDUWRZDUGEHFRPLQJWKHH[FOXVLYHGHVFULSWRURIWKHSURGXFWWKDWVHOOHUVRIFRPSHWLQJ
brands cannot compete effectively ZLWKRXWXVLQJWKHQDPHWRGHVLJQDWHWKHSURGXFWWKH\DUHVHOOLQJ´Id.
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begins to expropriate the trademark as the generic name. These companies often have spent
years developing their brands and their product has become the most popular either
because the trademark owner created the product or simply because the trademark owner
created the best product. And for these efforts they should retain trademark protection for
as long as consumers still identify the trademark with a specific product.
And the policy rationales identified by courts and academics are similarly supported
ZKHQ WUDGHPDUNV DUH SURWHFWHG ZKHQ FRQVXPHUV FRQWLQXH WR UHFRJQL]H D WUDGHPDUN¶V
brand-identifying function²despite majority usage being generic. First, when consumers
still recognize the significance of a trademark, there is a reduction in consumer search
FRVWV $V -XGJH (DVWHUEURRN QRWHG ³(DVLO\ LGHQWLILHG WUDGHPDUNV UHGXFH WKH FRVWV
consumers incur in searching for what they desire, and the lower the costs of search the
PRUH FRPSHWLWLYH WKH PDUNHW´146 Thus stripping trademark protection when consumers
continue to rely on the mark²even when those same consumers use the term generically
in non-purchasing scenarios²increases the transaction costs associated with buying a
product. The signals consumers use to reduce their search costs (in deciding which product
to purchase) will be absent because more than one product may bear the previously
trademarked term.
Second, a finding of genericism can disadvantage consumers because trademark
owners will no longer have the same incentive to maintain a consistently high-quality
product. Since trademarks identify a brand and encourage brand loyalty, which
incentivizes the trademark owner to produce a consistent quality product, the trademark is
a reflection of the proGXFHU¶VUHSXWDWLRQIRUTXDOLW\147 But when other products can carry
the same trademark that consumers once regarded as a mark of a certain quality, the
producer no longer has the same incentives. 148 Majority usage does not get to this problem.
Only primary significance does.
This policy rationale has no significance if consumers genuinely do not understand
that a trademark functions as a source-identifying mark (because consumers are not
FUHGLWLQJWKHWUDGHPDUNRZQHU¶VUHSXWDWLRQIRUTXDOLW\LIWKHFRQVXPHUGRes not recognize
the mark as identifying a single producer). But if consumers do associate a mark with its
producer²WKHWUDGHPDUNRZQHUEHLQJFRQVXPHUV¶SULPDU\DVVRFLDWLRQHYHQLIFRQVXPHUV
use the term generically in non-purchasing situations²then stripping the protections
trademarks enjoy can hurt consumers. This is because without trademark protection, the
IRUPHU WUDGHPDUN RZQHU¶V LQFHQWLYHV IRU KLJK TXDOLW\ DUH OHVVHQHG EHFDXVH FRPSHWLWRUV
146. Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 WK &LU   QRWLQJ DOVR WKDW ³>E@y
identifying the source of the goods, [trademarks] convey valuable information to consumers at lower costs. . . .
A trademark also may induce the supplier of goods to make higher quality products and to adhere to a consistent
OHYHO RI TXDOLW\´  -XGJH (DVWHUEURRN DOVR QRWHG WKDW ³>W@KH YDOXH RI D WUDGHPDUNLV LQD VHQVH D µKRVWDJH¶ RI
consumers; if the seller disappoints the consumers, they respond by devaluing the trademark. The existence of
WKLVKRVWDJHJLYHVWKHVHOOHUDQRWKHULQFHQWLYHWRDIIRUGFRQVXPHUVWKHTXDOLW\RIJRRGVWKH\SUHIHUDQGH[SHFW´
Id. at 1430 (footnote omitted). But if other sellers disappoint consumers who associate a trademark with the
original trademark owner, then the trademark is no longer hostage to the consumer and the incentives for high
quality dissipate.
147. See id. ³,IWKHVHOOHUSURYLGHVDQLQFRQVLVWent level of quality, or reduces quality below what consumers
H[SHFWIURPHDUOLHUH[SHULHQFHWKDWUHGXFHVWKHYDOXHRIWKHWUDGHPDUN´ 
148. Granted, a company could recoup those losses and regain consumer loyalty if it can adequately distinguish
itself IURPLWVFRPSHWLWLRQ%XWWKLVOLNHO\WDNHVWLPHDQGLQWKHLQWHULPWKDWFRPSDQ\¶VSURGXFWLVMXVWDQRWKHU
brand among various others that seem to be the same quality and bearing the same previously-trademarked term.
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can produce a lower-quality product cheaper but still trade on the former trademark
RZQHU¶VJRRGQDPHDQGUHSXWDWLRQ
In addition, the policy goals behind the genericism doctrine are not supported when
courts credit majority usage and ignore primary significance, except in a narrow
circumstance. The policy undergirding the genericide doctrine is usually framed as an
issue of competition. When the public no longer associates a trademark with a specific
brand, then it would have anticompetitive effects on the market for one company to
monopolize the market simply because it is the only company that can use the trademarked
WHUP$V-XGJH3RVQHUKDVQRWHG³LIQRRWKHUZRUGVKDYHHPHUJHGDVV\QRQ\PVLWPD\EH
difficult for a seller forbidden to use [a trademark] to communicate effectively with
FRQVXPHUV´149 In other words, as most scholars will concede, canceling a trademark
because of genericism certainly has its place.150 And that place is when consumers
genuinely no longer understand the source-identifying function a trademark performs.
But unless there is no alternative generic form of the trademarked term, protecting a
trademark does not confer a monopoly when consumers generally use the term generically
in some circumstances but continue to recognize the mark as their primary association.
And most trademarks have an additional generic form that competitors may use: Google
(perform an online search), Kleenex (tissue), Xerox (photocopy), Crock-pot (slow cooker),
and Band-Aid (bandage). Thus, when a court credits majority usage as controlling without
ensuring that the primary significance of the term has also become generic, in each of the
examples in this paper, the court would be stripping the trademark owner of protection
without equal competitive benefits advancing the market generally.
Granted, critics of distinguishing between majority usage and primary significance
argue that majority usage is the only accurate proxy for actual knowledge. One scholar has
DFNQRZOHGJHGWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW³HYHQWKRXJK>DSHUVRQ@FDOOVDOOFRSLHUVµ[HUR[HV¶VKH
knows deep down that Xerox LV D SDUWLFXODU EUDQG RI FRSLHU´151 But the problem with
GLIIHUHQWLDWLQJEHWZHHQNQRZOHGJHDQGXVDJHDUJXHV3URIHVVRU*UHHQH³LVDJHQHUDORQH
with subjective tests in various areas of the law; how can we ever really know what
VRPHRQH¶VOHYHORINQRZOHGJH LVRUZKDWWKHFRQWHQWVRIWKHLUEUDLQDUH"´152 He continues
WKDW³>L@QJHQHUDOXVHLVDJRRGSUR[\IRUNQRZOHGJHLQODUJHSDUWEHFDXVHSHRSOHLQPRVW
FRQWH[WVZLOOQRWEHµO\LQJ¶DERXWKRZWRSURSHUO\XVHDSDUWLFXODUWHUP´ 153
:KLOH3URIHVVRU*UHHQH¶VFULtique has merit, because subjective intent is difficult to
149. Ty Inc., 353 F.3d at 533 (emphasis deleted).
150. See Vincent N. Palladino, Genericism Rationalized: Another View, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 469 (2000)
(arguing that trademark law needs more stringent standards to protect against unwarranted genericide but also
FRQFHGLQJWKDW³WKHJHQHULFQHVVGRFWrine prohibits exclusive appropriation by one party of a term that others need
to use in order to compete in a market for goods or services, irrespective of what purpose trademarks once served,
QRZ VHUYH RU PD\ VRPHGD\ FRPH WR VHUYH´  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW    ³7KHPRQRSRO\UHVXOWLQJIURPWKHDSSURSULDWLRQRI
a generic name would be described as a product monopoly but is more accurately a language monopoly. Unless
the owner of the generic name were the lowest-cost producer . . . he would license the use of the name to
FRPSHWLWRUVDQGUHFHLYHUHQWVLQWKHIRUPRIOLFHQVLQJIHHV´ MCCARTHY, supra note 45, AT § 12:2 (4th ed.)
³7RJUDQWDQH[FOXVLYHULJKWWRRQHILUPRIXVHRIWKHJeneric name of a product would be equivalent to creating
DPRQRSRO\LQWKDWSDUWLFXODUSURGXFWVRPHWKLQJWKDWWKHWUDGHPDUNODZVZHUHQHYHULQWHQGHGWRDFFRPSOLVK´ 
151. Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75, 103 (2014).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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prove in any context, his argument misses the point for two reasons. First, courts should
not discount usage as a means to proving primary significance because people might lie
about how they use a particular term. Courts should not rely on majority usage because
usage does not necessarily track knowledge. In other words, a proxy remains a useful
concept only as far as it accurately reflects the concept it purports to predict. And majority
usage has the potential to greatly underestimate the level of trademarked significance.
3URIHVVRU*UHHQH¶VFULWLTXHPLVVHVLWVPDUNEHFDXVHWKHLVVXHLVQRWWKDWDFRQVXPHU
PLJKWXVHDWUDGHPDUNHGWHUPJHQHULFDOO\EXW³NQRZVLQKHUKHDUWRIKHDUWV´WKDWWKHWHUP
also refers to a brand.154 The Lanham Act requires more than mere awareness of the brand.
The primary significance test is the statutory test precisely because consumers likely use
a term generically, at least under certain circumstance, even when they associate the term
predominately with a particular brand. Linguistic data cannot distinguish between those
two instances. We do not expect people to lie. But we also do not expect people to always
XVHDWHUPFRQVLVWHQWO\ZLWKWKHLUFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHWHUP¶VSULPDUy significance.
6HFRQGSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHZHH[SHFWWKDW³SHRSOHLQPRVWFRQWH[WVZLOOQRWEHµO\LQJ¶
DERXW KRZ WR SURSHUO\ XVH D SDUWLFXODU WHUP´ 155 there are ways to determine primary
significance without resorting to usage data. For instance, in Elliott, evidence from various
surveys were introduced, and each survey gave consumers the chance to respond to how
they ordinarily use Google as a verb, either to search for information using the Google
search engine or using any search engine.156 The subjective intent problem is circumvented
by allowing consumers to voice their perception of a term. While some proxy evidence
PD\DLGLQVKRZLQJWKHSXEOLF¶VSUHGRPLQDWHFRQFHSWLRQRIDWHUPWKHSUR[\LQGLFDWRU
must accurately predict the primary significance. Since linguistic evidence comes well
equipped to determine majority usage but ill equipped to determine the significance of a
term to the consuming public, majority usage proves a poor proxy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Linguistic tools have the air of objectivity, and for this reason courts have often
employed them to demonstrate that a once-recognized trademark has become generic.
Dictionary entries especially are reverenced by some courts as the epitome of objectivity,
DOORZLQJFRXUWVWRWDNHSXOVHRIWKHSXEOLF¶VSHUFHSWion of a trademarked term. Examples
taken from newspapers and magazines have also persuaded courts that a term has lost its
distinctiveness as a source-identifying mark. While courts ought to employ these linguistic
tools to establish that the generic sense of a term is linguistically permissible, courts should
not, as courts have previously done, use dictionary definitions and media usage to prove
PRUHWKDQDZRUG¶VUDQJHRISRVVLEOHPHDQLQJV
Corpus linguistics, however, may prove more beneficial, especially to companies
seeking to protect their trademarks. Trademark owners may show that in a random sample
RI QDWXUDOO\ RFFXUULQJ ODQJXDJH WKH PDMRULW\ RI WKH XVHV LQGLFDWH WKH WUDGHPDUN¶V
proprietary sense. In this way, companies may show, despite the fact that dictionary
definitions and media usage prove that the trademark has a generic sense, the primary
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Elliot v. Google Inc., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1166±70 (D. Ariz. 2014).
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significance of a term references the producer rather than a general product.
<HWGHVSLWHFRUSXVOLQJXLVWLFV¶HPSLULFDO PHWKRGVLWFDQQRWFRQFOXVLYHO\Srove a
WHUP¶VJHQHULFQHVVEHFDXVHOLQJXLVWLFGDWDRQO\LQFOXGHVH[DPSOHVRIXVDJH7KH/DQKDP
Act, however, requires a showing of primary significance. Courts should maintain
majority usage and primary significance as distinct concepts and, in this way, should
reclaim the primary significance test.
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